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The Revolutionary War Prize Cases and
the Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction
DEIRDRE MASK†
PAUL MACMAHON††
Why did the Framers give the federal courts diversity
jurisdiction? This Article brings to light a crucial but
forgotten source of inspiration for diversity jurisdiction,
showing that previous explanations ignore the Framers’
experience judging prize case appeals during the
Revolutionary War. Scholars have largely rejected the view
that the Framers anticipated state bias in diversity
litigation, arguing, for example, that diversity jurisdiction
was designed to provide a high-quality venue for commercial
disputes. Yet placing the Framers’ decision in the context of
their lived experience as judges in contentious “Prize Cases”
during the Revolutionary War rehabilitates the geographic
bias theory. During the War, the Continental Congress relied
heavily on privateers—private citizens, who, with the
financial support of individual states or Congress, were
authorized to capture British ships. At George Washington’s
urging, the Continental Congress set up an adjudicatory
committee within Congress itself, the Committee on Appeals,
to resolve appeals from prize cases in the state courts. The
Framers’ taste of judicial work exposed them to contentious
interstate disputes—a preview of what diversity litigation
would look like in the new country. We argue that this
experience, almost entirely ignored by contemporary
† London School of Economics. J.D. Harvard Law School, B.A., Harvard College.
We would like to thank Richard Fallon, Kenneth Mack, Daniel Meltzer, David
Owen, Sarah Schindler, David Shapiro, and participants in the Aspiring Law
Professors Conference at the University of Maine Law School for their excellent
comments and input.
†† Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law (until summer 2014); Assistant
Professor of Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science (from
September 1, 2014).

477

478

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

scholars, directly inspired the otherwise perplexing decision
to include diversity jurisdiction in Article III.
INTRODUCTION
One hundred years after the Constitution was ratified,
James Bradley Thayer posed a difficult question: why
diversity jurisdiction?1 “Why is it,” Thayer asked, “that a
United States court is given this duty of administering the
law of another jurisdiction? Why did the States allow it? Why
was it important that the United States should have it?”2
These questions have been so enduring because the Framers
themselves failed to answer them. Henry Friendly, whose
influential 1928 article sought to answer Thayer’s questions,
pointed out that the “letters and papers of the men who were
to frame the Constitution” did not indicate that the Framers
had “given any large amount of thought to the construction
of a federal judiciary.”3
Nor were the records of the Constitutional Convention
“fruitful to a student of the [D]iversity [C]lause.”4 “Certain it
is,” he concluded, that diversity jurisdiction “had not bulked
large in their eyes.”5 Turning to colonial court records for
insight, Friendly found no evidence of prejudice against
citizens of other colonies to support the standard view that
fear of geographic bias prompted diversity jurisdiction.6 From
this, Friendly concluded that diversity “was not a product of
difficulties that had been acutely felt under the

1. Diversity jurisdiction is located in Article III of the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to . . . Controversies between
. . . citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof and
foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.”).
2. James Bradley Thayer, The Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 4 HARV. L. REV.
311, 316 (1891).
3. Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L.
REV. 483, 484 (1928).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 492-93.
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Confederation.”7 Instead, he proposed that diversity
jurisdiction arose out of “a vague feeling that the new courts
would be strong courts, creditors’ courts, business men’s
courts.”8
In an article published later that year, Felix Frankfurter,
Friendly’s mentor, agreed that diversity jurisdiction did not
spring from any actual experience of geographic bias.9
“Plainly enough, this phase of the ‘judicial power of the
United States’ did not grow out of any serious defects of the
Confederacy nor did it anticipate glaring evils,” he wrote.10
“The available records disclose no particular grievance
against state tribunals for discrimination against litigants
from without.”11 John Frank similarly concluded that
diversity was based on “a gloomy anticipation” of prejudice
against out-of-state commercial parties “rather than an
experienced evil.”12
But what was the actual experience of the Framers?
Conspicuously absent or sidelined from these accounts of the
origins of diversity jurisdiction is the Framers’ direct
experience serving as judges in the Revolutionary War “Prize
Cases.”13 Beginning in 1776, the Second Continental
7. Id.
8. Id. at 498.
9. Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States
and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520 (1928).
10. Id.
11. Id.; Julius Goebel made this same point about Article III as a whole,
concluding that “[t]he judiciary was subjected to much less critical working over
than the other departments of government . . . . [I]t is difficult to divest oneself of
the impression that . . . provision for a national judiciary was a matter of
theoretical compulsion rather than of practical necessity.” JULIUS GOEBEL, JR.,
1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 205-06 (1971).
12. John P. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7, 9
(1963). More specifically, Frank argued that Congress predicted commercial
activity and trade “on an unknown but vast scale . . . . If the Founding Fathers
could anticipate the industrial and commercial revolution, already beginning,
they could anticipate some of the obstacles to the success of the concomitant
business enterprise.” John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial
System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 27 (1948) [hereinafter Frank, Historical
Bases].
13. The Revolutionary War Prize Cases—the focus of this Article—are not to
be confused with the more famous Civil War Prize Cases, in which the U.S.

480

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

Congress determined disputes involving privateers, private
individuals or ships authorized14 by the government to attack
and capture enemy ships in exchange for a share of the
bounty.15 Usually seeking out merchant ships, privateers
tirelessly attacked the British during the Revolutionary War,
motivated by a powerful cocktail of greed and patriotism.
Because it was not always clear whether a captured ship was
British, American, or neutral, and because more than one
privateer sometimes participated in a capture, disputes over
the spoils arose early and often.
During the Revolutionary War, state admiralty courts
adjudicated these disputes in the first instance, but Congress
sought to oversee their work. Similar to its English
equivalent,16 the initial appeals “court” was actually a
committee within Congress, known as the “Committee on
Appeals.”17 Over thirty-seven members of Congress,
including John Adams, Edmund Randolph, and, most
importantly, the key architects of the future federal
judiciary—James Wilson and Oliver Ellsworth18—served as
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of President Lincoln’s pre-war
blockade of Southern ports. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 698-99
(1863).
14. The document that gave a privateer his commission was called a “letter of
marque.” See EDGAR STANTON MACLAY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRIVATEERS 7
(1899).
15. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a privateer as a “vessel owned, equipped,
and armed by one or more private individuals, and duly commissioned by a
belligerent power to go on cruises and make war upon the enemy, usually by
preying on his commerce.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (6th ed. 1990). For a
background on privateering in Britain and the early United States, see Theodore
M. Cooperstein, Letters of Marque and Reprisal: The Constitutional Law and
Practice of Privateering, 40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 221-26 (2009).
16. In Britain, the Lords Commissioners for Prize Appeals were located within
the Privy Council, though in the eighteenth century common law judges often
participated in the hearing of the appeals. HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST
FEDERAL COURT 18 (1977); see also GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 151 (“Incongruous
though it may seem, the resemblance between the earnest republicans who made
up the Standing Committee and the grandees commissioned as Lords
Commissioners of Appeal is very striking. Both bodies were similarly constituted;
both performed similar tasks and faced similar difficulties.”).
17. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 40.
18. Id. at 330.
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judges on the Committee, deciding appeals from the state
courts. Others, including Alexander Hamilton,19 practiced as
lawyers in prize disputes; James Madison20 worked behind
the scenes to improve the functioning of the appellate
process. Ultimately, Congress handed its jurisdiction over to
a new, freestanding court, the Court of Appeals in Cases of
Capture—our first federal court.21
Few articles engage meaningfully with the Prize Cases
or their influence on the shape of the federal judiciary.22 The
few that have done so generally only attribute their influence
to the decision to entrust admiralty jurisdiction to the federal
courts, and the power to issue “letters of marque”23 to
Congress.24 Several scholars, particularly in the late
19. Id. at 337.
20. Id. at 127.
21. The Prize Cases were not, however, the only judicial experience the
Continental Congress had. Congress also decided territorial disputes between
states, which surely also informed its view of litigation between states. But, as
Robert Steamer has noted, “the arrangements provided [for land disputes] were
temporary and haphazard.” Robert J. Steamer, The Legal and Political Genesis
of the Supreme Court, 77 POL. SCI. Q. 546, 562 (1962).
22. For example, two recent articles exploring the sources of Article III barely
mention the Prize Cases at all. See, e.g., Robert L. Jones, Finishing A Friendly
Argument: The Jury and the Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 1001 (2007) (mentioning the Court of Appeals in Cases of
Capture as the “only national court” prior to the ratification of the Constitution);
James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1634 (2011) (mentioning the Court of Appeals in Cases of
Capture only once in passing, despite the article’s close attention to James
Wilson, one of the most active participants in the Prize Cases).
23. “The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o declare war, grant letters of
marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land or water . . . .”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also id. § 10 (“No State shall enter into any treaty,
alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal . . . .”).
24. See Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 9 (“The experience of the
Confederation convinced virtually every conscientious patriot of the 1780s that
the admiralty jurisdiction ought to be totally, effectively, and completely in the
hands of the national government, and an extended search has not revealed a
criticism from any contemporary source of the clause of the constitution granting
federal admiralty jurisdiction.”). Wythe Holt, who extensively detailed local bias
in the Prize Cases, also discusses them in the framework of admiralty. Wythe
Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention
of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1427-30 (1989) [hereinafter Holt, The
Invention of the Federal Courts] (explaining that the men involved in the federal
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nineteenth
and
early
twentieth
centuries,
have
acknowledged the importance of the Court of Appeals in
influencing other aspects of Article III, contending that the
Prize Cases helped spark a shared understanding of the need
for a national judiciary,25 contributed to the separation of the
legislative and judicial branches of government,26 influenced
the breadth of congressional war powers,27 and played a
significant role in the designation of a single Supreme
Court.28 This Article seeks to highlight another legacy of the
admiralty court “presumably understood the problems of localism that the
national experience with admiralty had presented during the Confederation and
shared the general attitude of 1789 that admiralty jurisdiction should be an
exclusively national matter.”).
25. See, e.g., Steamer, supra note 21, at 560 (“There is no doubt that this action
by a national authority to standardize admiralty procedure is a clear antecedent
for a national judiciary.”).
26. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court
Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 741, 757 (1984) [hereinafter Clinton, Guided Quest]. Interestingly, the
Articles of Confederation, promulgated after the Committee on Appeals had been
operating for several years, specifically stated that “no member of Congress” could
be appointed to the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture. See ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. IX.
27. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1720
(2009).
28. J. Franklin Jameson, The Predecessor of the Supreme Court, in ESSAYS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD
1775-1789, 1, 5 (J. Franklin Jameson ed., 1889); J.C. Bancroft Davis, Federal
Courts Prior to the Adoption of the Constitution, 131 U.S. app. xix, xxxiv (1889);
Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 28; William F. Swindler, Seedtime of
an American Judiciary: From Independence to the Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 503, 519 (1976); Sidney Teiser, The Genesis of the Supreme Court, 25 VA.
L. REV. 398, 400 (1938). More recently, Robert Clinton acknowledged the vast
significance of the Prize Cases. See Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 26, at 757
(“[The Prize Case] experience demonstrated, however, the value of a court, like
the Court of Appeals, separate from the national legislature. The experience
highlighted, among other things, the need to avoid the ponderous delay and
inconvenience created by the ad hoc establishment of hearing tribunals, the
importance of the national disposition of certain judicial cases to orderly
diplomatic relations and to the domestic harmony of the states, the need for
judges who could decide such questions independent of any obligations owed to
the states that appointed them, and the extreme difficulty of enforcing national
judgments affecting important state interest.”). Clinton, however, does not
address the Prize Cases at length, noting that “[t]he judicial experience of the
confederation is detailed elsewhere.” Id.
THE
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Prize Cases: diversity jurisdiction.29
Modern accounts of the sources of diversity jurisdiction
gloss over this judicial experience, focusing instead on the
economic motives of the Framers. These theories of diversity
jurisdiction look, for example, to the failure of the states to
open their courts to British merchants as the Treaty of Paris
required,30 the Framers’ desire to counteract state anticreditor legislation,31 and the need for strong commercial
courts. Moreover, in an intriguing recent article, Robert
Jones contends that the Diversity Clause was actually
motivated by the Framers’ concern over the quality of federal

29. To our knowledge, this Article is the first to explore the relationship
between diversity jurisdiction and the Prize Cases in any depth, but it is not the
first to note it. Although this Article focuses on the Prize Cases’ influence on the
creation of a single Supreme Court, Sidney Teiser mentioned the relationship
between diversity jurisdiction and the Prize Cases in his 1938 article, The Genesis
of The Supreme Court. See Teiser, supra note 28, at 415 (noting that the members
of the Constitutional Convention “were fully acquainted with the desirability of
establishing a court having jurisdiction over disputes arising between different
states, and between citizens of different states—at least in respect to captures.”).
Henry Bourguignon, who wrote the definitive history of the Prize Cases, also
briefly mentioned the Prize Cases’ influence on a number of different aspects of
federal jurisdiction, including diversity. See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 332
(“The years of limping along with the congressional appellate prize court had
shown that many problems arose if state courts could determine finally cases of
captures, cases involving foreign or out-of-state litigants, or cases in which
national peace and harmony were at stake.”).
30. See, e.g., Wythe Holt, The Origins of Alienage Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA. CITY
UNIV. L. REV. 547, 552 (1989) [hereinafter Holt, The Origins of Alienage
Jurisdiction] (explaining that “[t]he Convention was worried about refusal by
state courts to uphold a previously ratified treaty or treaties”); see also Charles
Anthony Smith, Credible Commitments and the Early American Supreme Court,
42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 75, 77 (2008) (arguing “that a significant rationale for the
jurisdiction and design of the [Supreme] Court was to establish a credible
commitment to uphold trade agreements and resolve trade disputes with other
nations.”).
31. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise
of Legal Positivism, and A Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV.
79, 98 (1993) (noting that “[t]he prevailing perception appears to have been that
diversity courts were to have some freedom to apply laws independent of state
laws, particularly with regard to anticreditor legislation.”).

484

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

jurors; federal courts would have the power to select a
“superior class of individuals” to serve on federal juries.32
This Article does not intend to supplant the work of other
scholars in this area entirely. These scholars have provided
significant evidence that the Framers were motivated in part
by a desire to help creditors and merchants. We wish,
however, to reveal a key oversight in previous accounts,
which have largely examined the sources of diversity
jurisdiction without considering the lived judicial experience
of the Framers themselves.33 More generally, we seek to
reacquaint legal scholars with the Prize Cases, a rich source
of material for the historical legacy of diversity jurisdiction
and Article III as a whole.
Viewing diversity jurisdiction through the lens of the
Prize Cases teaches us three key lessons. First, previous
scholars have been wrong to claim that the Framers34 had
little actual experience that suggested a need to give
diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts. From their Prize
Case experience, the Framers had ample reason to worry
32. Jones, supra note 22, at 1086. For more on Jones’s argument, see infra
notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
33. Legal historians have long struggled with the difficulties of interpreting
the Framers’ intent. As Wythe Holt has said, “[w]e tend to think differently, to
think in terms of a separate, neutral legal realm of constitutionally prescribed
federal court jurisdiction, a realm where structural dictates are everything and
contingent political pressures are meaningless. It is a mode of thinking which the
generation of Framers did not use in any systematic fashion.” Holt, The Origins
of Alienage Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 548. See also Clinton, Guided Quest,
supra note 26, at 747 n.1 (“In searching for such original understanding, the legal
historian must also always remember that she is looking at the primary historical
data through lenses that have been clouded by contemporary issues and by the
perspective of intervening legal, social, and political history. Thus, in this sense
the legal historian’s quest for original understanding may never truly replicate
the framers’ understanding.”).
34. By “Framers,” we mean the men who attended the Constitutional
Convention. Because not all the members of the Constitutional Convention were
members of the Continental Congress, the men who witnessed the Prize Case
experience were not precisely the same ones who structured the Constitution.
However, four-fifths of the men at the Convention were also in Congress. See
Teiser, supra note 28, at 415. This is not, however, to imply that everyone involved
in the Prize Cases supported diversity jurisdiction, or even the Constitution,
though most did. See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 330 n.23 (listing as
examples of opponents Samuel Chase, Luther Martin, and William Paca).
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that state courts would be biased against parties from other
states.
Second, the Prize Cases suggested to the Framers how
federal courts could remedy this geographic bias, inspiring
the Framers to give the Supreme Court broad appellate
jurisdiction. But the Prize Cases also taught the Framers
that appellate jurisdiction over interstate disputes would not
suffice to combat the problem of interstate bias. Throughout
the War, colonial legislatures and courts disregarded
Congress’s jurisdiction, either restricting the right of appeal
to the congressional court, or, as exemplified in a few famous
cases, refusing to enforce Congress’s decisions at all. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 responded to these problems by
creating the inferior courts contemplated in the Constitution,
vesting original jurisdiction over diversity cases in those
courts, and providing for federal marshals to enforce the
decisions of those courts.35
Third, the Prize Case experience shows why diversity
litigation was considered essential by so many of the
Framers. Providing a national forum for these classes of
disputes could function as a means of avoiding national
conflicts with parties both foreign and domestic.
The evidence that the Prize Cases inspired diversity
jurisdiction (and other aspects of Article III) is powerful.
True, the Framers rarely mentioned the Cases specifically in
their debates. Yet the Framers most involved in drafting and
supporting Article III and the Judiciary Act—James Wilson,
Oliver Ellsworth, and James Madison—were among those
most deeply involved in arguing, deciding, and enforcing the
decisions of the Committee and the Court of Appeals. Even
those members of Congress who did not serve in the judicial
role debated and voted on key resolutions regarding the
Committee, and, later, the Court of Appeals.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a general
overview of the Prize Cases, the congressional Committee on
Appeals, and the Committee’s successor, the Court of
Appeals in Cases of Capture. Part II shows how the Prize
35. The first Congress imposed a five hundred dollar “amount in controversy”
for diversity suits, likely responding to complaints that litigants with small claims
would be dragged from their homes to answer in federal courts. See JUDICIARY
ACT of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 78 (1789).

486

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

Cases provide strong support for the “geographic bias” theory
of the Constitution’s grant of diversity jurisdiction, refuting
Friendly’s claim that geographic bias was not a significant
influence on Article III.
In Part III, we delve more specifically into how the Prize
Cases taught federal courts how to remedy these prejudices.
This Part extends the analysis to the Judiciary Act’s grant of
original jurisdiction over diversity cases to the inferior
federal courts, focusing attention on how federal trial courts
provided a remedy for the kinds of enforcement problems
encountered by the first federal tribunals in the Prize Cases.
In Part IV, we explain why the influence of the Prize Cases
is not limited to admiralty alone. And finally, in Part V, we
demonstrate how the Prize Cases showed the Framers the
need for diversity jurisdiction not only as a safeguard for the
nation’s economic future, but also as a means of avoiding real
crisis in the new nation.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE PRIZE CASES
A. Adjudicating the Prize Cases
When George Washington wrote a letter to Congress in
1775 about his troubles with the privateers, he likely did not
suspect he was pouring the foundation for the new country’s
federal judiciary.36 Washington was harassed by complaints
from the American privateers, private citizens who had taken
to the sea to capture British ships. The practice of
privateering was not new; the British had long used
privateers when they needed to supplement their standing
military force.37

36. Letters from George Washington to the President of Congress (Nov. 11,
1775), reprinted in 2 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: BEING HIS
CORRESPONDENCE, ADDRESSES, MESSAGES, AND OTHER PAPERS, OFFICIAL AND
PRIVATE 155 (Jared Sparks ed., 1834) [hereinafter Letters from George
Washington]. For more general background of what led to the letters, see
BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 43-45.
37. See Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of the Colonial Vice-Admiralty
Courts (Part II), 27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 323, 332 (1996) (explaining that the “arming
of private vessels was an absolutely vital means of increasing the size of a
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Privateering was essential to the success of the
Revolutionary War; privateers captured or destroyed three
times as many vessels as the tiny Continental Navy.38
Writing to the Marine Committee, Congressman Silas Deane
boasted that privateering “effectually alarmed England,
prevented the great fair at Chester, occasioned insurance to
rise, and even deterred the English merchants from shipping
goods in English vessels at any rate of insurance.”39 An
Englishman wrote from Jamaica in 1777 that “from sixty
vessels that departed from Ireland not above twenty-five
arrived in this and neighboring islands, the others, it is
thought, being all taken by American privateers. God knows,
if this American war continues much longer we shall all die
with hunger.”40
American privateers hunted down ships on the other side
of the Atlantic too. English Whig politician Horace Walpole
wrote that, “American privateers infest our coasts; they keep
country’s naval forces in an era when maintenance of a large standing military
force was not possible.”).
38. See MACLAY, supra note 14, at viii (pointing out that the navy captured 196
vessels, while privateers captured about 600). The number of captured American
ships may even have been higher than this. As Maclay also reports, an alderman
testified at the House of Lords that “the number of ships lost by capture or
destroyed by American privateers since the beginning of the [W]ar was seven
hundred and thirty-three, whose cargoes were computed to be worth over ten
million dollars.” Id. at xiii.
39. Id. at xii. Other examples abound. John Adams, for example, complained
that the success of the privateers was not sufficiently reported in the press. He
wrote in 1777:
One of the most [s]killful, determined, persevering, and successful
[e]ngagements that have ever happened upon the [s]eas, have been
performed by American [p]rivateers against the [p]rivateers from New
York. They have happened upon the [c]oasts and seas of America, which
are now very well swept of New York privateers, and have seldom been
properly described and published even there, and much more seldomer
ever inserted in any of the [g]azettes of Europe, whether it is because the
actions of single and small [v]essels and these [p]rivateers are not
thought worth publishing, or whether it has been for [w]ant of some
[p]erson to procure it to be done.
Letter from John Adams to Edmé Jacques Genet, The Adams Papers Digital
Editions, MASS. HISTORICAL SOC’Y (May 3, 1780), available at
https://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?id=PJA09d168.
40. MACLAY, supra note 14, at xi-xiii.
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Scotland in alarms, and even the harbor of Dublin has been
newly strengthened with cannon.”41 Over the course of the
War, 1697 privateer ships manned by 58,400 men roamed the
seas.42
Privateering men grew wealthy.43 Most American
privateers “devoted themselves mainly to commerce
destroying,” capturing merchant ships bearing rich cargo.44
As just one example, American privateers captured a ship
from Africa carrying “four hundred and fifty negroes, some
thousand weight of gold dust, and a great many elephant
teeth . . . worth [an estimated] twenty thousand pounds.”45
And this at a time when the average wage in America was
eight pounds a year.46 It soon became difficult to attract men
to the army from the sea.47
41. Letter from Horace Walpole to Horace Mann (July 17, 1777), reprinted in
24 THE YALE EDITION OF HORACE WALPOLE’S CORRESPONDENCE, 315-316
(W.S. Lewis, ed. 1937-1983), available at http://images.library.yale.edu/
hwcorrespondence/page.asp?vol=24&seq=331&type=b; see also Letter from John
Adams to James Warren, The Adams Papers Digital Editions, MASS. HISTORICAL
SOC’Y (Mar. 31, 1777), available at http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/
portia.php?id=PJA05d079 (“[A]ll the Ports of France and Spain, and Italy, and all
the Ports in the Mediterranean, excepting Portugal, are open to our Privateers
and Merchant Ships.”).
42. Randolph B. Campbell, The Case of the “Three Friends”: An Incident in
Maritime Regulation During the Revolutionary War, 74 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIO. 190,
193 (1966). The Northern states—Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland and
Connecticut—account for the vast majority of these commissions. North Carolina
apparently issued none. Id.
43. John Adams spoke of dining with a Mr. Bleakly after the War, whom he
said “made a very large fortune during the War by privateering, and since the
Peace, came to Europe to enjoy it.” Diary of John Quincy Adams, The Adams
Papers Digital Editions, MASS. HISTORICAL SOC’Y (Mar. 5, 1785), available at
http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?id=DQA01d713.
44. EVARTS BOUTELL GREENE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY
467 (1922). Note, however, that many privateers later joined the navy. See
MACLAY, supra note 14, at 79 (noting that “some sixty of our most formidable
privateers were commanded by men who were, or soon afterward became,
captains in the navy.”).
45. MACLAY, supra note 14, at xiii.
46. M. RUTH KELLY, THE OLMSTEAD CASE: PRIVATEERS, PROPERTY, AND POLITICS
151 n.39 (2005).

IN PENNSYLVANIA

47. See GREENE, supra note 44, at 467.
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But as with most profitable ventures, the privateers’
success came with bitter disputes. A captured ship was
ordinarily taken to a port, then registered with the local
admiralty court.48 The profits from the sale of the ship and
cargo were ultimately distributed between the privateer and
the state or the Continental Congress—whichever
government had given the ship its commission.49 But
capturing a ship was often only the beginning of a long legal
battle. The ship’s owners might deny that the ship was an
enemy vessel and seek to recover the Prize. In addition,
privateers from different states sometimes claimed to have
captured the same ship, forcing litigation over the relative
shares of the Prize money.50
The issues these disputes raised were decided under
international law.51 In England, privateering disputes had
been heard in the Vice-Admiralty courts since the fourteenthcentury.52 In the colonies, similar Vice-Admiralty courts were
eventually established, and these courts heard privateering
disputes arising from eighteenth-century British wars.53 But
once the Revolution broke out, the colonial Vice-Admiralty
courts—which had been particularly hated by the

48. When privateers first brought a ship into port, “the judge of the admiralty
or vice-admiralty [court] was to complete the preparatory examination of the key
members of the crew of the captured ship and he was to issue monition or public
notice to all parties concerned in the trial of this vessel.” BOURGUIGNON, supra
note 16, at 139. Privateers in America and Jamaica then filed a “libel,” a “highly
stylized bill” that functioned as a complaint. Id. at 141. Evidence was then taken,
with interrogatories often prepared by the captors for the crew of the captured
ship. Id. at 139, 143.
49. See id. at 47.
50. Teiser, supra note 28, at 400 (explaining that “[i]t often occurred that ships
owned by inhabitants of the different colonies, and sometimes also by the Colonies
and the Congress, all contributed to a capture. Under such circumstances,
disputes over prize moneys arose, which were not satisfactorily settled by the
courts of the state wherein . . . the prize was brought.”).
51. For an overview of substantive prize law during the Revolution, see
BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 238-96.
52. See id. at 4.
53. See id. at 22-26.
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colonists54—could not be counted upon to resolve the
inevitable and contentious disputes that privateering
produced.55
At the start of the Revolutionary War, Prize disputes
were in General Washington’s hands alone. Having other
things to do, Washington wrote to the Continental Congress
asking to be relieved of the burden of adjudicating these
cases. Might Congress set up a court to resolve them?
“Whatever the mode is which [Congress is] pleased to adopt,
there is an absolute necessity of its being speedily
determined on; for I cannot spare [t]ime from [m]ilitary
[a]ffairs, to give proper attention to these matters.”56
B. The Committee on Appeals
But instead of establishing a special trial court, as
Washington had suggested, Congress directed the states to
set up their own courts to decide Prize disputes. Unusually,
Congress resolved that Prize Cases be decided by jury, a
significant deviation from English practice in admiralty
cases.57 But Congress followed English precedent in another
54. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1720
(2009) (explaining that the “[Vice-Admiralty] courts—which lacked juries—were
also responsible for enforcing the trade laws against the colonists, rendering them
extremely unpopular.”); see also David S. Lovejoy, Rights Imply Equality: The
Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America 1764–1776, 16 WM. & MARY Q.
459, 461 (1959). Because of the previous animosity, the Continental Congress
“studiously avoided” the name “Courts of Admiralty.” Jameson, supra note 28, at
6.
55. For more, see Jameson, supra note 28, at 5 (“Where the governor had acted
as judge, he was now in flight. The admiralty judges, as dependents of the
governor, would most likely flee also; and the more so because their courts had of
late years become highly unpopular, since a recent act had placed many
infractions of the revenue laws under their jurisdiction, so that they were tried
without a jury.”).
56. Letters from George Washington, supra note 36.
57. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 46. Note that some states disregarded
congressional command to use juries in prize disputes. Delaware never allowed
juries to decide Prize Cases, and Pennsylvania did not after 1780. Id. at 192.
Maryland, North Carolina, and Massachusetts did not always use juries in Prize
suits. Id. (explaining that “[t]hough not universally used, juries were definitely
the rule and not the exception in prize litigation.”).
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respect, by reserving appellate jurisdiction to itself in all
Prize Cases.58 Congress sometimes acted legislatively, and
sometimes played the role of an executive body. Now,
Congress also took on a judicial role.59
Washington’s response to Congress’s actions was
lukewarm. Perhaps anticipating the difficulties that would
later arise, he wrote back to Congress that “[t]he resolves
relative to captures made by Continental armed vessels only
want a court established for trial to make them complete.”60
And, in fact, Congress’s plan to oversee Prize disputes by
hearing appeals from the state courts did not go smoothly.
Although the states generally applied the law according to
the resolutions of Congress and the law of nations,61 they
jealously guarded their jurisdiction over their cases. Each
state believed it had the power to establish its own courts and
to define their jurisdiction—including the scope of the right
of appeal to Congress in Prize Cases.62 Consequently, nearly
every state limited appeals to the Committee and, later, to
the Court of Appeals. Massachusetts and New Hampshire,
58. See id. at 45-46.
59. Congress also took on a semi-judicial role deciding boundary disputes in
“ad hoc” tribunals. Swindler, supra note 28, at 514. But the court was, as Jameson
points out, “called into existence only a very few times (three apparently), and
actually convened and pronounced judgment in one case”—a dispute between
Pennsylvania and Connecticut over Wyoming. Jameson, supra note 28, at 3.
Notably, James Wilson was the lawyer for Pennsylvania, which prevailed in the
dispute. William Ewald, James Wilson and The Drafting of the Constitution, 10
U. PA. J. CON. L. 901, 910 (2008).
60. Letters from George Washington, reprinted in 3 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON: BEING HIS CORRESPONDENCE, ADDRESSES, MESSAGES, AND OTHER
PAPERS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE 196-97 (Jared Sparks ed., 1837).
61. See 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (Dec. 4, 1781), at 1158
(Washington Chauncey Ford ed., rev. ed. 1904-1937) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS] (“The rules of decision in the several courts shall be
the resolutions and ordinances of the United States in Congress assembled, public
treaties when declared to be so by an act of Congress, and the law of nations,
according to the general usages of Europe. Public treaties shall have the preeminence in all trials.”).
62. Swindler, supra note 28, at 513-14 (“The language of state legislation often
explicitly limited appeals to a higher court within the state jurisdiction or was
sufficiently ambiguous to enable states to determine the legality of an appeal to
the national court.”).
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for example, only allowed appeals in disputes involving ships
outfitted by Congress.63 Rhode Island and Connecticut
allowed a broader appellate jurisdiction, but excluded several
kinds of cases from appellate review by Congress.64 Georgia
allowed appeals only after a second trial by a special jury.65
Pennsylvania only permitted appeals on questions of law. 66
Only New Jersey, Delaware, and South Carolina allowed
Congress its full appellate jurisdiction.67 Most states thus
disregarded congressional authority in some way, despite the
fact that the draft of the Articles of Confederation in July
1776 gave Congress the exclusive power to decide Prize Case
appeals.68
On July 4, 1776, the first Prize appeal—regarding a ship
named the Thistle—was presented to Congress.69 Naturally
enough, Congress was engrossed in other tasks, and did not
get to the appeal for several months.70 In the case of the
Thistle, and the six appeals that followed it, members of
Congress rotated through the Committee, with John Adams,
James Wilson, Oliver Ellsworth, Edmund Randolph, and
many others serving as appellate judges.71 The shifting
membership of the Committee had at least one beneficial side

63. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 74.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 75.
67. Id.
68. GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 163 (“All of these assertions of state sovereignty
fell just short of overt hostility to central management of common concerns. What
lent these statutes a peculiarly aggressive quality was the fact that in the first
draft of the Articles of Confederation (July 1776) Congress had been given power
to establish rules of prize as well as courts to receive and finally determine
appeals in all cases of captures.”).
69. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 81. This was not, however, the first case
that had been presented to Congress. There was some confusion initially about
the Court’s jurisdiction; the first two applications made to Congress were for
exercise of “original jurisdiction,” which it declined. See Davis, supra note 28, at
xxii.
70. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 81.
71. Id. at 329 n.22.
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effect: it exposed dozens of members of Congress both to prize
cases and to the judicial process more generally.72
But a crack in the system appeared early on:
inconsistency. Although Congress and the states were, in
theory, following the “law of nations” and the English Prize
system, there was little knowledge of Prize law in Congress,
and little access to relevant books.73 And the inconsistency in
the Committee’s membership led to inconsistency in the law;
the law announced in one case was not necessarily followed
in another. Nor was the membership of the Committee
always clear, even in an individual case; in the case of the
Phoenix, for example, Congress heard three appeals before
the case was decided, in part because the case had initially
been heard by the wrong members of Congress.74
In January of 1777, based on the experience of eight
appeals, Congress passed a series of resolutions that
composed a “standing [C]ommittee” of five members to decide
the cases, appointing ad hoc members during the inevitable
absences.75 The Committee began functioning even more like
an appellate court.
Still, others campaigned for an even more permanent
situation for the Committee. In 1779, a group of merchants
in Philadelphia—which included James Wilson—wrote to
Congress imploring it to revamp the appellate system.
Noting that “[c]ertainty in the [l]aws is the great [s]ource of
the people’s [s]ecurity,” the Philadelphians wrote that “[i]n a
[c]ourt where there is this [c]onstant change and succession
72. Id. at 90-91 (noting that over the forty-two appeals heard when the
Committee was active, “thirty-seven members of Congress were at one time or
another appointed to sit on the Committee of Appeals.”).
73. Id. at 189 (explaining that without a more comprehensive book available
on Prize law, “American lawyers and judges who took the trouble to read what
was then available could only find a hazy picture of [P]rize procedures which must
have closely resembled the [P]rize practice they could see in their own viceadmiralty courts.”); see also GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 154 (indicating that
“[t]here were no available admiralty reports, for the jurisprudence as practiced
and applied in the High Court was a memory jurisprudence of the most arcane
variety.”).
74. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 87.
75. See Davis, supra note 28, at xxiii.
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of [j]udges, it is impossible that fixed principles can be
established, or the doctrine of precedents ever take place.”76
This uncertainty, the letter continued, created obstacles to
justice that caused unreasonable delay particularly harsh on
the privateers. “In the privateering trade in particular, the
very life of which consists in the adventurers receiving the
rewards of their Success and Bravery as soon as the Cruize
is over, the least delay is uncommonly destructive.”77
C. The First Federal Court
Spurred in part by the Philadelphia merchants’ letter,
and in part by the irritation and time demands of handling
Prize appeals,78 Congress began paving the way for a
permanent court, appointing committees to devise the
framework for how the Court would work. Four years after
Washington’s request, the Court of Appeals in Cases of
Capture—the first federal court—was finally established.
Congress selected three judges—George Wythe, William
Paca, and Titus Hosmer79—and in 1780, all appeals were
transferred from the Committee to the new Court.80 The
Court operated much like the Committee, using similar
procedures to admit and take evidence, and continuing to reexamine facts after a jury verdict, including reviewing new
depositions.81 And like the Committee on Appeals, the Court
of Appeals depended on the states for the enforcement of its
decisions.

76. Jameson, supra note 28, at 24-25.
77. Id. at 25-26. Further, the merchants complained that the Court only ever
sat where Congress resided, so “parties who attend it are perhaps under the
necessity of coming to Congress from the most distant parts of the United States”
at great expense and time. Id. at 25.
78. Unquestionably, the Committee demanded a great deal of time from the
otherwise busy Congressmen and became a headache. See infra notes 354-67 and
accompanying text367 (discussing the Committee being delayed by the
Pennsylvania legislature and the U.S. Supreme Court).
79. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 116.
80. Id. at 119.
81. GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 177.
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Despite their short life span,82 the Committee on Appeals,
and later, the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, became
the testing ground—a “graduate seminar”83—for the national
judiciary. The Court decided nearly 120 cases, upholding
state judgments in thirty-nine appeals, and reversing them
in forty-nine, before its closure in 1787.84 An active break
from English practice, the freestanding Court of Appeals was
not only the first federal court, but also the predecessor of a
single Supreme Court. The new Supreme Court’s docket
included many cases that began life in the Court of Appeals
in Cases of Capture; the Supreme Court was quick to affirm
the Capture Court’s jurisdiction and demand enforcement of
its decisions.85 But the experience would also play a less
obvious role in shaping the national judiciary, and diversity
jurisdiction in particular.
82. John C. Hogan, The Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, 33 OREG. L. REV.
95, 103–04 (1953). The end of the court was less dramatic than its beginnings. In
1784, no new appeals were being filed, and two of the judges wrote to Congress
explaining that the docket was cleared. Id. at 103. Congress then swiftly resolved
that the Court would continue, but that the salaries of the judges should
“henceforth cease.” Id. The judges were upset about losing their salaries. Id.
Congress then explained that it was
impressed with a sense of the ability, fidelity, and attention of the Judges
of the Court of Appeals . . . but that, as the [W]ar was at an end, and the
business of that court in a great measure done away, an attention to the
interests of their constituents made it necessary that the salaries of the
said judges should cease.
Id. The Court did have further business with rehearings, and the judges
continued to sit at an allowance of ten dollars a day, until the closing of the court
in 1787. Id. J. Franklin Jameson pointed out that “Hamilton, it is interesting to
find, during his brief term of service in Congress, made a characteristic attempt
to prolong the life of this federal institution, feeling doubtless that any such
institution was, for ‘continental’ reasons, too valuable to be allowed to expire.”
Jameson, supra note 28, at 35.
83. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 319.
84. See id. at 217, 319.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 140 (U.S. 1809) (“By the
highest judicial authority of the nation, it has been long since decided, that the
court of appeals erected by congress had full authority to revise and correct the
sentences of the courts of admiralty of the several states, in prize causes.”);
Jennings v. Carson, 4 Cranch 2, 21-22 (U.S. 1807) (holding that the Continental
Congress had authority to establish appellate tribunals over Prize Cases);
Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dal. 54, 113 (U.S. 1795) (same).
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II. BOLSTERING THE GEOGRAPHIC BIAS THEORY OF DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION
A. Traditional View of Diversity Jurisdiction
As described above, the traditional view of diversity
jurisdiction—that it arose from geographic bias against
citizens from out-of-state—has largely been discarded by
scholars of Article III’s origins. This Section rehabilitates the
traditional view of diversity, and refutes Friendly’s challenge
to it, through a close examination of geographic bias in the
Prize Cases.
Despite its current unpopularity, the traditional view
has always had strong evidence on its side. Judging from the
few contemporaneous statements the Framers actually made
about diversity jurisdiction, their stated motive for its
inclusion was clear: federal jurisdiction over disputes
between citizens of different states, and between Americans
and foreigners, was intended to mitigate bias against
outsiders, particularly in matters of debt collection.
Though it was unchallenged at the Continental
Congress,86 diversity jurisdiction was controversial during
the ratification debates. Madison argued in Virginia that
diversity jurisdiction was necessary because
[i]t may happen that a strong prejudice may arise, in some states
against the citizens of others, who may have claims against them.
We know what tardy, and even defective, administration of justice
has happened in some states. A citizen of another state might not
chance to get justice in a state court, and at all events might think
himself injured.87

86. Friendly, supra note 3, at 486-87 (quoting 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 168, 169-70 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter
Farrand, Records]) (“Mr. Baldwin of Georgia told Ezra Stiles in December that
the delegates had been ‘unanimous also in the Expedy & Necessy of a supreme
judicial Tribunal of universal Jurisdiction—in Controversies of a legal Nature
between States—Revenue—& appellate Causes between subjects of foreign or
different states.’”).
87. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901) [hereinafter
Elliot’s Debates].
THE
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Hamilton echoed these concerns in The Federalist
Papers. The principle that “[n]o man ought certainly to be a
judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to which he
has the least interest or bias[,]” weighed heavily “in
designating the federal courts as proper tribunals for the
determination of controversies between different states and
their citizens.”88 Therefore, these cases must “be committed
to that tribunal, which, having no local attachments, will be
likely to be impartial between the different states and their
citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the union,
will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the
principles on which it is founded.”89
Even more striking are the statements of James Wilson
and Oliver Ellsworth, the two Framers with perhaps the
most influence on the national judiciary. James Wilson, one
of the most active Framers in arguing and deciding Prize
Cases, was, as Friendly noted, “the most enthusiastic
defender of [the Diversity] [C]lause of the new
Constitution.”90 Wilson asked “[h]ow a merchant must feel to
have his property lay at the mercy of the laws of Rhode
Island? I ask further, how will a creditor feel who has his
debts at the mercy of tender laws in other states?”91
Similarly, Oliver Ellsworth, who drafted the Judiciary Act,92
is reported to have said that “our Juries” were “generally
prejudiced” against “foreigners” and that
[t]he Laws of nations & Treaties were too much disregarded in the
several States—Juries were too apt to be biased against them, in
favor of their own citizens & acquaintances; it was therefore

88. Hamilton went further than diversity with this justification, adding “[a]nd
it ought to have the same operation in regard to some cases between citizens of
the same State.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 498 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry
Cabot Lodge ed., 1889).
89. Id. at 497.
90. Friendly, supra note 3, at 486.
91. 2 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, 491-92.
92. The first draft of the act is in Ellsworth’s hand. Charles Warren, New Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 50 (1923).
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necessary to have general Courts for causes in which foreigners
were parties or citizens of different States[.]93

From these statements of the Framers, the traditional
view, as articulated by Charles Warren, is that “[t]he chief
and only real reason” for diversity was “to afford a tribunal
in which a foreigner or citizen of another State might have
the law administered free from the local prejudices or
passions which might prevail in a State Court against
foreigners or non-citizens.”94 Warren added, for emphasis:
“[t]here is not a trace of any other purpose than the above to
be found in any of the arguments made in 1787-1789 as to
this jurisdiction.”95 Robert Brown agreed, writing in 1929
that
[t]here seems to be no disagreement as to the primary purpose of
this provision for federal jurisdiction based upon diversity of
citizenship. It was to provide, so far as possible, against injury to
nonresident suitors because of local and sectional prejudice, which
would be extremely unlikely to have an important effect in state
courts.96

Courts, too, have largely adopted the idea that
geographic bias, or at least, avoiding the appearance of bias,97
motivated diversity jurisdiction.
93. Commentary from William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 910, 1789), reprinted in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800: ORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: LEGISLATION
AND COMMENTARIES 496, 497-99 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992).
94. Warren, supra note 92, at 83.
95. Id.
96. Robert C. Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity
of Citizenship, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 181 (1929).
97. See, e.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 354 (1855) (“The foundation of the
right of citizens of different States to sue each other in the courts of the United
States, is not an unworthy jealousy of the impartiality of the state tribunals. It
has a higher aim and purpose. It is to make the people think and feel, though
residing in different States of the Union, that their relations to each other were
protected by the strictest justice, administered in courts independent of all local
control or connection with the subject-matter of the controversy between the
parties to a suit.”); Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809)
(“However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer
justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is
not less true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this
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B. Friendly’s Rejection of the Traditional View
But in 1928, Henry Friendly upset this standard view.98
In The Historical Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, Friendly
proposed an alternative theory for the source of the Diversity
Clause.99 First, Friendly dismissed the Framers’ statements
about state prejudice, calling their defense of diversity
jurisdiction “apath[etic].”100 As an example, Friendly pointed
to Madison’s less than rousing defense at the state
ratification debates: “As to its cognizance of disputes between
citizens of different states, I will not say it is a matter of much
importance. Perhaps it might be left to the state courts.”101
And although Madison also said that “[i]t may happen
that a strong prejudice may arise, in some states, against the
citizens of others, who may have claims against them[,]”102
Friendly did not take that claim seriously. “Madison does not
point out any specific examples of prejudice, does not allege
that any exist; Madison even gives the innuendo that none
do exist.”103 And, Friendly added, “if there had been no
injustice under the chaos and state jealousy of the
Confederation, why was there cause for apprehension as to
subject, . . . that it has established national tribunals for the decision of
controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different
states.”).
98. Friendly was only eight months out of law school at the time. Louis H.
Pollak, In Praise of Friendly, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 40 (1984) (quoting Henry J.
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 483
(1928) (noting that “[t]he paper must have been conceived when the author was
still in student status, for he was at pains to acknowledge his substantial
indebtedness ‘to Professor Felix Frankfurter . . . both for suggesting the subject
of this paper and for constant help in its preparation.’”)).
99. This view might perhaps be better called the Frankfurter-Friendly view,
given Frankfurter’s input into the article. See id.
100. Friendly, supra note 3, at 486.
101. Id. at 487 (quoting 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 533). Friendly does,
however, leave out the next section of Madison’s quote, in which he adds “[b]ut I
sincerely believe this provision will be rather salutary than otherwise.” 3 Elliot’s
Debates, supra note 87, at 533.
102. Friendly, supra note 3, at 492 (quoting 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87,
at 533).
103. Id. at 493.
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prejudice under the new regime of the Constitution?”104
Similarly, Friendly explained that “[e]ven the statesman who
was to be most closely identified with the creation of a
powerful federal judiciary”—future Chief Justice John
Marshall—“admitted in regard to diversity jurisdiction:
‘[w]ere I to contend, that this was necessary in all cases, and
that the government without it would be defective, I should
not use my own judgment.’”105
Instead of relying on the Framers’ statements, Friendly
searched for actual evidence of bias in the state courts before
the drafting of the Constitution, and found the record of
prejudice lacking.106 He reviewed the results of litigation
between diverse parties in state law reports.107 Although he
acknowledged that the state reports only gave a “fraction” of
the cases, “such information as we are able to gather from
the reporters entirely fails to show the existence of prejudice
on the part of the state judges.”108 In the nine diversity of
citizenship cases he found in Connecticut, for example, he
concluded that “the record of the court is highly creditable.
In only two of them was the domestic party victorious, and
these cases could not well have gone the other way.”109
Friendly found little evidence of state bias in other state
reports, and “none have been found which indicate undue
prejudice on the part of the local tribunal.”110 From this
evidence, Friendly concluded, “there was little cause to fear
that the state tribunals would be hostile to litigants from
other states.”111
But what motivated diversity, if not fear of interstate
prejudice? Friendly’s answer was straightforward: “the
desire to protect creditors against legislation favorable to
debtors was a principal reason for the grant of diversity
104. Id.
105. Id. at 487-88 (quoting 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 556).
106. Id. at 493.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 494.
111. Id. at 497.
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jurisdiction . . . .”112 State courts and state legislatures could
not be trusted with commercial litigation.113 Friendly
explained how in New Hampshire, for example, “the
legislature was equally occupied with tasks that are
commonly thought to be exclusively the business of the
courts.”114 For example, the New Hampshire legislature
vacated judgments and annulled deeds, and even allowed
“certain litigants to secure review of judgments, though the
time for taking such action had passed.”115 “Not unnaturally,”
Friendly wrote, “the commercial interests of the country were
reluctant to expose themselves to the hazards of litigation
before such courts as these.”116 Friendly could not, however,
pin down exactly why the Framers thought federal courts
would provide a better forum for commercial cases than state
courts.117 Although he briefly discussed the superior method
of appointment, the tenure of judges, and the “practical
workings of the system,”118 ultimately he believed the
Framers had no more than “a vague feeling that the new
courts would be strong courts, creditors’ courts, business
men’s courts.”119
Modern scholars have been quick to adopt Friendly’s
view that geographic bias against citizens from different
states was not the true source of diversity jurisdiction. Felix
Frankfurter—Henry Friendly’s mentor—agreed that “[s]uch
distrust as there was of local courts derived, not from any fear
of their partiality to resident litigants, but of their general
inadequacy for the interests of the business community.”120
John P. Frank echoed that diversity stemmed from a belief
that “the federal courts would be more sympathetic to
112. Id. at 496-97.
113. Id. at 498.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 497.
119. Id. at 498.
120. Frankfurter, supra note 9, at 520.
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business interests than the state courts.”121 More recently,
Patrick J. Borchers has argued that instead of geographic
bias, “diversity was intended at least in part as a protection
against aberrational state laws, particularly those regarding
commercial transactions.”122 And invoking in part Friendly’s
argument, Judge Posner has agreed that “[b]ias played a
smaller role in the creation of the diversity jurisdiction than
is generally believed . . . .”123
In short, as Debra Lyn Bassett concluded, “today’s major
argument for retaining diversity jurisdiction—the protection
of out-of-state litigants from local bias—is not supported by
the original constitutional documents. There is no reason to
believe that local bias was a reason, much less the reason,
behind the creation of diversity jurisdiction.”124
Compelling arguments. Thus, despite the stated intent of
the Framers, Friendly’s dismissal of geographic bias as the
central concern of the Framers in favor of a more economic
rationale is now considered “authoritative.”125
C. Friendly’s View Reconsidered in Light of the Prize Cases
Friendly’s dismissal of the geographic bias theory is
arguably problematic even on its own terms. Hessel E.
Yntema and George H. Jaffin, for example, have provided
ample reason to doubt Friendly’s claims that the Framers
cared little about diversity jurisdiction.126 The idea that
121. Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 27.
122. Borchers, supra note 31, at 81.
123. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE
(1999).
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124. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 119, 130 (2003).
125. Pollak, supra note 98, at 41 (“Friendly’s article was and remains the
authoritative study of the genesis and early days of diversity jurisdiction.”); see
also Borchers, supra note 31, at 81 (“[D]iversity was intended at least in part as
a protection against aberrational state laws, particularly those regarding
commercial transactions.”); Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 27 (echoing
that diversity stemming from “the federal courts would be more sympathetic to
business interests than the state courts.”); Frankfurter, supra note 9, at 250.
126. See generally Hessel E. Yntema & George H. Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis
of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 869 (1931).
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“staunch federalists, such as Madison and Marshall, gave
‘tepid’ support to the federal diverse-citizenship jurisdiction,
probably should be taken cum grano salis . . . .”127 If the
Framers’ statements in defense of diversity jurisdiction
sometimes seem tepid, Yntema and Jaffin argued that it was
only because the Constitution’s supporters had to be
circumspect in the face of substantial opposition.128 “The
attitude of the federalists during the controversy succeeding
the Constitutional Convention was necessarily conciliatory,
as they desired primarily to assure the ratification of the
Constitution.”129 Yntema and Jaffin also rejected Friendly’s
claim that state bias did not exist in the state courts, pointing
out there was “[n]o contemporary denial of the existence of
local prejudice” and that the records of the time were “full
enough of evidence of local feelings.”130
But these critiques of Friendly are, perhaps, beside the
point; when considering the Framers’ motives, whether bias
actually existed in interstate litigation does not matter as
much as whether the Framers believed that bias existed.
Friendly’s claim hinges on the argument that actual bias
“had only a speculative existence in 1789”131 and that “the
provision with which we are to be concerned in this study was
not a product of difficulties that had been acutely felt under
the Confederation.”132 We do not know whether the Framers
127. Id. at 875 n.12.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 876-77 n.13. Wythe Holt has offered a similar critique:
[I]t would not be accurate to conclude from such a sparse record, as
Friendly concluded about diversity jurisdiction, that federal courts were
“not a product of difficulties that had been acutely felt under the
Confederation” or that “fears of local hostilities . . . had only a speculative
existence in 1789 . . . .” [D]ebtors suffered “acutely” during the
Confederation period, thereby creating “difficulties” for creditors that the
Constitution was designed to solve.
Holt, The Invention of Federal Courts, supra note 24, at 1425 (quoting Friendly,
supra note 3, at 484, 510). Unlike Friendly, Holt found in his own search of records
evidence of bias in the state courts. See id. at 1455-56.
131. Friendly, supra note 3, at 510.
132. Id. at 484.
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were actually aware of interstate bias in the state courts in
commercial cases. We do know, however, what the Framers
saw firsthand adjudicating disputes between diverse parties
in the Prize Cases. Taking this experience into account
upsets Friendly’s claim that the Framers’ stated
justifications for diversity were somehow insincere.
The Prize Cases, which frequently involved disputes
between interstate or international claimants, were riddled
with the very local bias that Friendly denied existed in the
colonial courts. After reviewing the Prize Case records
closely, Henry Bourguignon, who wrote the definitive history
of the Prize Cases, concluded that in most cases state courts
generally decided Prize disputes in favor of privateers from
their state, “even in the face of direct evidence of neutrality
or American ownership of a prize.”133 “Out-of-state or foreign
litigants could be denied justice by state admiralty courts,”
he explained, “and their pleas to Congress called forth
reassuring promises that justice would be done, but little
effective relief.”134
And, although the records do not always reveal whether
a court’s decision was only the product of geographic bias,
several cases show its obvious influence. A Massachusetts
jury, for example, awarded the entirety of a Prize to a
Massachusetts privateer, “despite the latter’s clear
agreement with a Rhode Island privateer to share all prizes,
and the decree was affirmed by the Massachusetts superior
court.”135 In Connecticut, privateers regularly targeted ships
belonging to New York citizens, even though there was no
proof of British ownership, and the Connecticut courts
regularly upheld those seizures.136
133. Gerard W. Gawalt, Henry J. Bourguignon, The First Federal Court. The
Federal Appellate Prize Court of the American Revolution 1775-1787, 22 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 271, 272 (1978) (reviewing BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16).
134. Id.
135. Holt, The Invention of the Federal Courts, supra note 24, at 1429.
136. Id. In another example, a New Jersey court awarded the Mermaid, a
British transport ship, to a New Jersey boat crew and owner, rather than to outof-state privateers; it is unclear whether it was because the Mermaid reached the
prize first, or because “the boat crew were local residents, while the privateers
were from other states.” BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 271.
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Bias was also a factor in one of the most famous Cases of
the era, the case of the Lusanna.137 In short,138 the Lusanna
was sailing from Boston to London and back—its cargo full of
hundreds of casks of valuable spermaceti oil and “head
matter”139—when it was forced by a storm to stop in
Canada.140 Having taken a British registry to leave Canada,
Shearjashub Bourne, the son-in-law of the ship’s owner,
posed as a loyalist once the ship reached London to make the
ship’s departure back to Canada easier.141 Once in Canada,
he and the crew would be able to throw off their loyalist
“cover” and return to Boston. Unfortunately, a New
Hampshire privateer ship, the McClary, captured the
Lusanna before it made it back to Canada, and libeled it in a
New Hampshire court. This put Bourne, and his father-inlaw, Elisha Doane, in the difficult position of explaining that
the ship had only been posing as loyalist.142
Doane and Bourne, both Massachusetts-based, hired
John Adams to represent them in New Hampshire.143 But
things did not look to be in Doane’s favor. The day before the
137. See Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm'rs, 3 U.S. 54 (1795).
138. The facts of many of the Prize Cases are byzantine, and even more so in
the case of the Lusanna. The details of the Lusanna are laid out in all of their
complex glory here. See Editorial Note, The Adams Papers Digital Editions, MASS.
HISTORICAL SOC’Y 357-62 [hereinafter Editorial Note], available at
http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?id=LJA02d082#LJA02d0
82n77.
139. “Head-matter” was the “waxy head-matter encased in the skull of the
Sperm” whale, used for making candles. Dauril Auden, Yankee Sperm Whalers in
Brazilian Waters, and the Decline of the Portuguese Whale Fishery (1773-1801),
20 THE AMERICAS 267, 275 (1964).
140. See Editorial Note, supra note 138, at 358.
141. Id. at 358-59.
142. See id. at 362-65. Posing as a loyalist was a common way of doing business
during the Revolutionary War. See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 242
(explaining that “[b]ecause of the difficulties of commerce immediately before and
during the [W]ar, an American merchant often found his property liable to
capture by both the British and the Americans. The merchant resorted to many
ruses such as double papers to protect their property and therefore, when
discovered engaging in suspicious activities, at times were forced to give
complicated and implausible explanations of their conduct.”).
143. See Editorial Note, supra note 138, at 362-63.
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trial, Adams wrote to his wife, Abigail, that the case of the
Lusanna
[C]omes on Tomorrow, before my old Friend Dr. Joshua Brackett,
as Judge of Admiralty. How it will go I know not. The Captors are
a numerous Company, and are said to be very tenacious, and have
many Connections; so that We have Prejudice, and Influence to
fear: Justice, Policy and Law, are, I am very sure, on our Side.144

Despite “Justice, Policy and Law,” Doane lost the case
in the New Hampshire court.145 On appeal to the New
Hampshire Superior Court, he lost again.146 New Hampshire
did not then allow appeals to Congress unless the ship had
been outfitted by the “United Colonies.”147
But Doane petitioned Congress to hear his case
anyway.148 The Committee on Appeals ruled that it had
jurisdiction, and the case was soon transferred to the new
Court of Appeals.149 There, with James Wilson as his
lawyer,150 Doane complained that the jury was biased against
him in favor of privateers from their home states.151 Even if
the Court of Appeals ruled in his favor, he believed that the
New Hampshire courts would not heed the Court’s
decision.152 And indeed, when the new Court of Appeals
reversed the New Hampshire decision, the New Hampshire
court refused to enforce the Court of Appeals’ decision,

144. Id. at 364. Just because Judge Brackett was a “friend” of Adams, didn’t
mean he was unbiased. As C. James Taylor points out, “Brackett may have been
JA’s old friend, but he was undoubtedly a current acquaintance of at least 10 of
the McClary owners, who, with him, were members of [minister] Ezra Stiles’
congregation.” Id. at n.52.
145. Id. at 365-68. Interestingly, the Lusanna marked the end of John Adams’s
legal career; according to his autobiography, he was in court for the case when he
learned that he had been appointed to go to France. See id. at 368.
146. GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 179.
147. Id.
148. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 244.
149. Id. at 179-80.
150. Id. at 251 (describing Wilson’s arguments on appeal).
151. See Editorial Note, supra note 138, at 369.
152. Id. at 372-73.
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arguing again that the Court lacked jurisdiction.153 Only after
the passing of the Judiciary Act—eighteen years after the
initial trial—was the decision enforced in New Hampshire,
at the instance of the U.S. Supreme Court.154
In another case, both Ellsworth and Wilson defended a
client from an obvious case of geographic bias. The Hope, full
of “[h]ogshead and tierces of rum, sugar and limes, a ‘kegg of
tamarines,’ barrels of yams, India chintz, ‘black sattin’ and
women’s gloves,”155 was seized by Connecticut privateers.
The ship’s owner, Aaron Lopez, a Jewish merchant156 from
Massachusetts, had a business transporting goods from
Jamaica.157 Though Lopez claimed he was “and ever ha[d]
been a true and faithful Subject of the United States of
America,”158 the privateers claimed the Hope was an enemy
ship.159 At the trial in Hartford, the judge refused to accept
two jury verdicts, which, though unreported, were
presumably in Lopez’s favor.160 He sent the jury back to
deliberate a third time, after which they could not agree. The
judge then impaneled a second jury, which, as one account of
the case concluded, “promptly . . . reported a verdict in favor
of the local boys . . . .”161 The judge accepted this verdict.162
“[O]pen and base partiality I discovered in some of the

153. Id. at 372-73.
154. Id. at 373-75. Doane had died by this time. Id. at 372.
155. Lee M. Friedman, Aaron Lopez’ Long Deferred “Hope,” 37 PUBL’NS. AM.
JEWISH HIST. SOC’Y, 103, 108 (1947). With such wealth taken from the ship, it is
no surprise that he wrote to Ellsworth, asking his advice on securing a court date
and when, as “[he] propose[d] to attend it in person.” Id. at 103.
156. Lopez was also a notorious slave trader. See Virginia Bever Platt, “And
Don’t Forget the Guinea Voyage”: The Slave Trade of Aaron Lopez of Newport, 32
WM. & MARY. Q. 601, 602 (1975).
157. Friedman, supra note 155, at 103-04.
158. Id. at 105.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 110.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Hon’ble bench[,]” Lopez wrote in a letter to a friend and
rabbi.163
Ellsworth had represented Lopez in the state courts,164
and Wilson and William Lewis were his counsel on appeal.165
The Committee on Appeals reversed the decision, restoring
the ship and its contents to Lopez.166 Yet, like Doane, Lopez
struggled to have the Committee’s decision enforced. He filed
a suit against the marshal in the Connecticut court, which
was dismissed, and then appealed to the Hartford Superior
Court.167 Finally, the Connecticut courts issued an order
giving effect to the Committee’s decision in 1782, though it
was not actually enforced until September of 1783.168
This evidence of bias in the Prize Cases is unsurprising
considering that prejudice against those from other states
was rampant during the Revolutionary period. Unneighborly
disputes over trade led to interstate jealousies as states
imposed high protective tariffs on their goods.169 Frustrations
over the imbalance of war debt added to the grievances, as
did the bitter disputes with regard to paper money, the value
of which was always fluctuating. The Georgia legislature, for
example, refused to accept any currency other than its own
for confiscated property, a decision that a correspondent of
Governor Caswell said was done “to humble the pride of the

163. Id. at 103. Of course, it is difficult to untangle the bias Lopez experienced
as an out-of-stater from the anti-Semitic bias he also likely suffered. But the
record does not differentiate between the two biases; likely, it was a combination
of both, though neither bias seemed to influence the jury the first two times they
deliberated.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 110.
166. Id. at 111.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 113. Indeed, bias against non-local parties did not just come from
juries; it often came in a delay or outright refusal to enforce decisions. For more,
see the discussion of Olmstead, infra Part III.C.
169. See ALLAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING
REVOLUTION 555-68 (1969).

AND

AFTER

THE

2015]

THE PRIZE CASES

509

North Carolinians, who refuse to take [Georgia’s] money, but
at an under rate.”170
Unsurprisingly, then, Washington then found his
soldiers prejudiced against each other. North Carolinians
were accused of being lazy, and the New Englanders
complained of being called “damned Yankees.”171
(Washington wasn’t immune to these prejudices, writing
that he found the New Englanders he was camped with
“exceedingly dirty and nasty people.”172) John Adams
complained that rumors circulated of New Englanders
“running away perpetually, and the Southern troops as
standing bravely.”173 As historian Allan Nevins reports, a
Brigadier-General in the Continental Army wrote that “‘the
Pennsylvania and New England troops would as soon fight
each other’ as the British,” a claim Nevins concludes was “no
great exaggeration.”174
In this context, many of the Framers, reviewing case
after case in which prejudice was alleged, must have
appreciated that state courts could be geographically biased,
or at least that litigants claimed them to be.175 The nature of
the Prize Cases perhaps even exaggerated these biases,
inflating the levels of interstate prejudice in the eyes of the
170. Id. at 570.
171. Id. at 548.
172. Id. at 549. Adams complained that Washington “often mention[ed] things
to the disadvantage of some part of New England” and that all of his aides came
from the South, and showed no respect for New England. Id. at 551.
173. Id.
174. Id. Interestingly, Nevins reports, the troops helped changed Washington’s
mind. In 1777, in a speech to the troops, Washington said,
[w]ho, that was not a witness, . . . could imagine, that the most violent
local prejudices would cease so soon; and that men, who came from
different parts of the continent, strongly disposed by the habits of
education to despise and quarrel with one another, would instantly
become but one patriotic band of brothers?
Id. at 554.
175. See Holt, Invention of Federal Courts, supra note 24, at 1429 (discussing,
in the context of admiralty, how examples of bias, such as the ones in the Lopez
case, “demonstrate why local bias against nonlocal citizens, both American and
foreign, was obvious to many in the prize litigation emanating from the
Revolution.”).
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Framers; privateering carried risk and enormous reward for
both the privateer and the colony that had outfitted it,176
heightening the incentives for a jury to lean in favor of a local
figure. It was not always clear who was the enemy—a
loyalist—and who was a faithful American. Further, the law
of nations was so little understood, even by the judges of the
state courts,177 that jurors likely struggled with the standards
they were asked to apply, making it easier to fall back on local
prejudices.178 In this way, the nature of privateering disputes
aggravated local feelings against outsiders that might have
been present anyway. Diversity begins to seem “a product of
difficulties that had been acutely felt under the
Confederation.”179
By stressing that the Framers had good reason to fear
geographic bias in the state courts, we do not mean to argue
that the grant of diversity jurisdiction was not also inspired
by “economic, social, and political”180 divides in the new
nation. Critics of the traditional view have succeeded in
showing that the Framers were motivated in part by a desire
to create courts favorable to commercial concerns. But in
many instances, it is difficult to disentangle different kinds
of bias; prejudice against outsiders often overlaps with
prejudice against commercial parties. Geographic bias
systematically favors one set of interests: preferring a
neighbor to a stranger meant keeping money in the
community. And in cases where an out-of-state merchant was
accused of being British—such as Elisha Doane’s Lusanna or
176. Privateering carried great rewards for lawyers as well. John Adams wrote
in his diary in 1777 that “[y]oung [g]entlemen who had been [c]lerks in my [o]ffice
and others whom I had left in that [c]haracter in other [o]ffices were growing rich,
for the Prize Causes, and other [c]ontroversies had made the profession of a
[b]arrister more lucrative than it ever had been before.” 4 DIARY AND
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 1 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961).
177. See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 71, 95.
178. See Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh
Amendment, 87 IOWA L. REV. 145, 177 (2001) [hereinafter Harrington, Economic
Origins] (“[S]tate court juries, lacking the expertise in the law of prize held by the
vice-admiralty judges, often ignored well-established principles of the laws of
nations and adjudged ships taken by local captains and crews to be lawful prize.”).
179. Friendly, supra note 3, at 484.
180. See Jones, supra note 22, at 1008.
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Aaron Lopez’s Hope—local bias may well have been
intensified by a bias against, or at least a misunderstanding
of, commercial dealings.
The Framers likely saw the federal courts as a way to
mitigate both the geographic and commercial biases in the
state courts. The Committee on Appeals and later the Court
of Appeals were, in some respects, commercial courts that
dealt kindly with merchants—almost always returning
property to American merchants whom state courts had
claimed to be British.181 As Bourguignon has put it, “the
judges showed an appreciation of the difficulties in which
American merchants had found themselves during the [W]ar.
The judges tended to accept the arguments of the interested
parties to explain away the incriminating evidence present
at the time of the capture of their property.”182 The judges on
the Court of Appeals were already setting a precedent for a
court system that was sensitive to the problems faced by
merchants—domestic and foreign.183 This attention to the
needs of merchants, however, does not suggest that
geographic bias was not also an independent motivation for
diversity jurisdiction, particularly when so many of the
merchants were themselves out-of-staters.
III. HOW FEDERAL COURTS MITIGATE GEOGRAPHIC BIAS
Identifying geographic bias as a source of diversity
jurisdiction raises the question: how could a national
judiciary fix problems of geographic bias in diversity suits?
Again, the Prize Case experience offers a fresh perspective on
this question. First, the Prize Cases directly inspired the
Framers’ initial decision to vest the Supreme Court with
jurisdiction over “Law and Fact,”184 giving the Court the
ability to overrule biased jury decisions. Second, the Framers
learned that resting diversity jurisdiction in inferior courts
could help mitigate bias in decision-making. Finally, the
Prize Case experience taught that the state courts and
marshals could not always be trusted to enforce federal
181. See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 251.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

512

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

decisions in cases where geographic bias was a factor.
Without real enforcement powers of the kind provided by the
Judiciary Act, federal appellate power would be toothless.
A. Appellate Jurisdiction as to Both “Law and Fact”
The first lesson the Prize Case experience taught the
Framers is that, at the very least, they would need to create
a federal appellate court that could overrule biased jury
decisions in diversity litigation. Article III of the Constitution
provides that the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction over cases “affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be
Party.”185 In all other cases, however, the Constitution
provides that “the [S]upreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”186
James Wilson explained the breadth of the clause at the
Convention, explaining that it meant that the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction extended to “fact as well as law—and to
cases of Common law as well as Civil Law.”187 No comments
about this phrase were made after this statement, and the
provision passed with ease.188 Thus, although Congress could
curtail the Supreme Court’s power to review issues of fact,
the drafters of Article III provided for a default rule that
would allow the Court to overrule a state court jury’s
decision.189

185. Id.
186. Id. (emphasis added).
187. 2 Farrand, Records, supra note 86, at 431.
188. See Ralph A. Rossum, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions
Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385, 393 (1983).
189. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 552 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (explaining that “the Supreme Court shall possess appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, and that jurisdiction shall be subject to such
exceptions and regulations as the national legislature may prescribe.”) (emphasis
omitted); see also 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 572 (statement of Edmund
Randolph) (noting that Congress “may except generally both as to law and fact,
or they may except as to the law only, or fact only.”).
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A Supreme Court with the power to overturn jury
decisions, though surprising today, would have been familiar
to Framers with close connections to the Prize Cases. The
Committee on Appeals and the Court of Appeals regularly
decided factual issues.190 Unrestricted by the record below,
the Committee and the Court reviewed factual issues in
contested cases de novo, allowing new depositions to be taken
and commissioning state officers to take depositions from
those too distant to travel to Philadelphia.191 Congress
repeatedly affirmed both the Committee’s and the Court’s
ability to examine “decisions on facts as decisions on the
law.”192 Although the Framers envisioned that Congress
would curb the Supreme Court’s review in many civil cases,193
the Prize Case experience perhaps explains why the Framers
did not balk at this broad grant of jurisdiction that was so
divisive in the state conventions.
Indeed, the Framers explicitly invoked the Prize Case
practices when justifying their grant of appellate jurisdiction
over factual matters to the Supreme Court. At the
Constitutional Convention, Wilson argued that “[t]he
jurisdiction as to fact may be thought improper; but those
possessed of information on this head see that it is
necessary.”194 Wilson continued:
Those gentlemen who during the late war had their vessels retaken,
know well what a poor chance they would have had, when those
vessels were taken into other states and tried by juries, and in what
a situation they would have been, if the court of appeals had not

190. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 211-12.
191. Id.; see also GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 159-60.
192. 13 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 281, 283
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1909).
193. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to Thomas Brand-Hollis, FOUNDERS
ONLINE (Jan. 4, 1788), available at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Adams/99-02-02-0305 (writing that “[o]ur new constitution does not expressly say
that juries shall not extend to civil causes.—Nor, I presume, is it intended, to take
away the trial by jury in any case, in which you, sir, yourself would wish to
preserve it.”).
194. Remarks of James Wilson at the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 7, 1787),
in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 520
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
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been possessed of authority to reconsider and set aside the verdict
of those juries.195

Hamilton also invoked the Prize Cases to support the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over factual
questions, explaining in The Federalist Papers that “the reexamination of the fact is agreeable to usage, and in some
cases, of which prize causes are an example, might be
essential to the preservation of the public peace.”196
Ultimately, the Constitution’s critics successfully argued
that the provision would allow judges to usurp the power of
the jury trial; the Seventh Amendment conceded the point,
limiting the Supreme Court’s power to review juries’ factual
determinations in “Suits at common law.”197 Nevertheless,
inspired by the Prize Cases, the Framers envisioned that the
Supreme Court could have some power to neutralize jury
biases, even in the absence of inferior federal courts.
B. Replacing State Court Decisionmakers
But appellate jurisdiction alone would only go so far; by
providing the option for federal inferior courts in the
Constitution,198 the Framers recognized that controlling the
decision-making at the trial level would be an even more
effective means of mitigating bias. Without lower courts,
Madison had argued, “appeals would be multiplied to a most
oppressive degree; that, besides, an appeal would not in
195. Id. at 514, 520-21.
196. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 189, at 551.
197. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.; Harrington, Economic Origins, supra note 178,
at 147-48 (explaining that the “Seventh Amendment was really the climax of the
long struggle over the right of the jury to find both law and fact in civil cases, and
was designed to achieve a compromise between those who believed that the jury
should have unfettered power to decide law and fact and those who sought to
allow judges to impose some limits on the jury’s power to decide the whole of a
case.”).
198. The Randolph proposal had provided for lower courts, but some delegates,
believing that the state courts would better function as lower courts, brought a
motion to eliminate federal inferior courts. The motion passed. Madison and
Wilson then moved to provide the new Congress with the option of establishing
lower courts, which was “enough to double the vote for lower courts.” See Frank,
Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 10.
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many cases be a remedy.”199 “What was to be done after
improper verdicts, in state tribunals, obtained under the
biased directions of a dependent judge, or the local prejudices
of an undirected jury?” he asked.200 “To remand the cause for
a new trial would answer no purpose. To order a new trial at
the supreme bar would oblige the parties to bring up their
witnesses, though ever so distant from the seat of the
court.”201 Inferior courts could resolve these issues of bias at
the local level.
Admittedly, late eighteenth-century juries exercised far
more power than juries do today; they even decided questions
of law. Given that federal jurors would still hail from a
particular locality, how would decision-makers in the inferior
courts differ from their state counterparts? One answer is
that federal judges would facilitate a different selection of
eligible jurors. According to Robert Jones, “the key to
understanding the origins of diversity jurisdiction is to
recognize the dramatic ways in which federal juries were
intended to differ from their state counterparts.”202 Most
states “provided local sheriffs with virtually unlimited
discretion to impanel jurors of their own choosing.”203 By
circumventing state sheriffs, federal marshals would have a
“plenary power to dictate the compositions of federal
juries.”204 This power would allow those marshals to
“pervasively control the political, economic, and social
composition of the federal juries.”205 Jones makes Friendly’s
“vague” idea that federal courts would be better more
specific: “the Framers believed that the tight control
maintained by federal officials over the selection of juries in
federal courts would transform the federal courts into a
superior forum, i.e., one that was more aligned with the

199. See 5 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 159.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Jones, supra note 22, at 1003.
203. Id. at 1004.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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values and perspectives of the Framers than the state
courts.”206
Jones’s view is consistent with the difficulties the
Framers faced reviewing verdicts by juries in prominent
Prize Cases. Yet Jones’s account perhaps overly diminishes
the role of the judge in the inferior courts. Judges, too, had to
be chosen carefully. The judges of the colonial era were
generally not learned men of the law. Early America simply
lacked well-trained lawyers, and there was little difference
between juries and the judges who oversaw them.207 It was,
as Anton-Hermann Chroust has said, “necessary and, in
some places, considered even advisable, to resort to judges
not familiar with the law.”208 This was “especially true in the
lower courts;” but even state supreme courts “also had their
share of incompetent and often ill-tempered laymen.”209
Although juries did have more power than they do today, they
were not self-directed. Prize Case litigants like Aaron
Lopez—who suffered a judge sending a jury back three times
before receiving the answer the judge wanted—knew that
even unbiased juries could be thwarted at the hands of a
biased judge.210
The Framers therefore would have seen the power to
appoint learned judges on a federal salary and with life
tenure on the bench as another way to mitigate geographic
bias. Congress had already shown its willingness to appoint
serious lawyers to the Court of Appeals in Cases of
Capture.211 One judge, William Paca, had practiced law in the
206. Id. at 1005.
207. See BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN
EARLY CONNECTICUT 71 (1987) (“In background, experiences, and outlook,” Mann
has argued, “[juries] were much like the litigants whose disputes they
determined, and not very different from the judges who oversaw them.”).
208. Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Legal Profession in Colonial America, 33
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 57 (1957).
209. Id.
210. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
211. Congress had initially appointed George Wythe, arguably the first law
professor, and Titus Hosmer, a prominent lawyer who had gone to Yale, to the
Court, but Wythe declined and Hosmer died before he could take office. See
BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 116-17.
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Inner Temple in London before entering the Maryland bar,
and had been the chief judge of the Maryland General
Court.212 Cyrus Griffin had studied at Edinburgh and the
Middle Temple.213 George Read had a longstanding legal
practice in Philadelphia, sometimes acting as a lawyer in
Prize Cases.214 John Lowell had been to Harvard and studied
law in a leading office in Massachusetts.215 Appellate or
otherwise, judges like these—staffing a federal court and
paid by the United States—would presumably be more
disciplined to the law and less accountable to local biases.
C. Enforcing Federal Court Decisions
Well-trained judges loyal to federal interests would, too,
be more likely to actually enforce an appellate decision—a
courtesy the state judges did not always afford to the
Committee or Court of Appeals. The Prize Case experience
taught that even if the Supreme Court could overrule biased
jury decisions in diversity suits, that power would be hollow
without the ability to execute its decisions. Winning an
appeal is one thing; getting cash (or ship and cargo) in hand
is another. The Committee on Appeals, and later the Court of
Appeals, were dependent on the officials of state admiralty
courts—the very courts whose judgments they were
overturning—to carry out their judgments.216 Although states
frequently implemented appellate rulings with no
212. Id. at 117.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 120.
215. Id. at 121.
216. GREENE, supra note 44, at 563 (“The absence of a federal judiciary made
Congress dependent on the state courts for the enforcement of its will on
individual citizens, and this illustrates the fundamental weakness of the
Confederation. So far as the individual was concerned, his primary allegiance was
to the state in which he lived and the federal government could not reach him
directly. Congress could make a treaty, but its enforcement depended on the
efficiency and good will of state governments.”); see also BOURGUIGNON, supra note
16, at 317-18 (explaining that “the political realities repeatedly frustrated
congressional efforts to execute the decrees of its court of prize appeals. If a state
government or state court stuck to its determination to negate the effectiveness
of these appellate decrees, Congress had no weapons in its scanty arsenal of
powers to compel compliance.”).
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objection,217 they flagrantly refused to enforce several of the
most controversial Prize Case decisions.
James Wilson, a lawyer in at least six cases before the
Committee or the Court,218 was perhaps more aware of the
difficulties of enforcing the Prize Case appeals than any other
Framer. Recall that Wilson was one of the appellate lawyers
in the case of the Lusanna,219 in which New Hampshire
refused to enforce the Court of Appeals’ decision a dozen
years after the appellate court had handed down its
decision.220 Similarly, Wilson was Aaron Lopez’s lawyer in his
longstanding battle to have his decision enforced in
Connecticut.221 Wilson had surmised, after Lopez prevailed
on appeal, that the merchant might face difficulties enforcing
a favorable decision, warning Lopez that “some efforts might
be taken in Connecticut to prevent him from obtaining the
full effect of the decree of the Court of Appeals.”222 This was
an understatement; it took Lopez nearly three years and two
more court cases in Connecticut to have his judgment
enforced.223
But no case better illustrates Wilson’s firsthand
experience of enforcement difficulties than the Olmstead
case, in which another state—this time, Pennsylvania—
refused to give effect to a Committee on Appeals judgment.224
217. Holt, Invention of the Federal Courts, supra note 24, at 1427 n.13
(criticizing Bourguignon for his “failure to indicate the degree and promptness of
enforcement by state courts of most decrees of the federal admiralty appeals
courts, . . .”). Nevertheless, in the cases that would have been known to most
Congressmen, such as the Olmstead case, enforcement difficulties were
pronounced.
218. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 329.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 136-68.
220. See Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. 54, 80-82, 85 (1795) (holding that
the decisions of the Court of Appeals were binding on the states).
221. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 226.
222. Id. While Bourguignon frames this as evidence that the admiralty courts
executed decrees of the appellate court “as a matter of course,” Wilson’s letter,
which describes Wilson’s desire to know if there are any difficulties so that “he
could let Congress know,” seems to indicate otherwise. Id.
223. Friedman, supra note 155, at 113.
224. Olmstead is a case which, one historian has said, “displays all the inherent
qualities of a romance, and its scenes are crowded with the most distinguished
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In 1778, Gideon Olmstead, a Connecticut fisherman, was
taken prisoner along with his crew by a British ship, the
Active.225 The Active was sailing to New York with arms and
supplies for the British army, and Olmstead was forced to
assist in the navigation.226 Remarkably, Olmstead and his
crew, though outnumbered three to one, overcame their
British captors in a fierce battle and took the ship as their
own.227 Olmstead set sail for New Jersey with what he now
believed was his prize.228
As the newly-captured Active neared the shore, an
American privateer ship—the Convention—seized the Active
after a chase and a fight.229 The Convention was owned and
outfitted by the state of Pennsylvania, and was assisted in
the capture by another privateering ship it was sailing with,
the Le Gerard; together, all three ships then sailed for
Philadelphia.230 The privateers of the Convention, with those
of the Le Gerard, now claimed the Active as their own prize.231

personages, who are arrayed against each other in situations which are highly
dramatic.” Hampton Carson, The Case of the Sloop ‘Active,’ 15 PENN. MAG. HIST.
& BIO. 385, 386 (1892).
225. Id. For additional details of the facts, see KELLY, supra note 46; William O.
Douglas, Interposition and the Peters Case 1778-1809, 9 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1956);
Kenneth W. Treacy, The Olmstead Case, 1778-1809, 10 W. POL. Q. 675 (1957).
226. Carson, supra note 224, at 386.
227. Id. The facts of Olmstead’s takeover are even more gripping than his
contentious court battle. Olmstead and his outnumbered crew managed to rise
and take over the ship, locking the crew of the Active in the “hatches.” Not giving
up easily, the British melted spoons into bullets and forced them up the hatches.
Ultimately, Olmstead, regained control, but the British captain “cut a hole
through the stern and wedged the rudder so as to prevent Olmstead from
steering” only giving up when forced by hunger and thirst. Id. at 387.
228. Although Olmstead wasn’t commissioned as a privateer, this does not seem
to have raised a problem in the courts. Bourguignon surmises that he may have
based his claim on a congressional resolve that allowed non-commissioned ships
to capture British ships where the capture was made “near the shores of any of
these colonies, by the people of the country.” BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 103.
229. Treacy, supra note 225, at 675.
230. Id. at 675-76.
231. KELLY, supra note 46, at 36.
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And it was quite a prize: the ship and its cargo were worth
hundreds of thousands of pounds.232
Although Connecticut resident Olmstead had already
captured the ship before the Convention and the Le Gerard
had arrived, the Pennsylvania jury233 gave just one-fourth of
the prize to the outsider Olmstead and his companions. They
awarded the remainder of the prize to the captain and crews
of the Convention and the Le Gerard, who would share their
awards with the jury’s home state of Pennsylvania.234 With
Benedict Arnold235—himself a Connecticut native, providing
the security for his appeal—Olmstead appealed to the
Committee on Appeals, with James Wilson as his counsel.236
The Committee, whose membership included Oliver
Ellsworth,237 reversed the lower court’s ruling and awarded
the full prize to Olmstead.238
232. Id. at 41, 151 n.39 (describing currency approximations).
233. See Carson, supra note 224, at 388 (explaining that the judge “found
himself unable to overcome the local prejudices of the jury in favor of the mariners
of their own State, . . .”). This case could be biased against Olmstead in more ways
than one; Gary Rowe pointed out that “the Pennsylvania Packet, a leading
Philadelphia newspaper, ran a long story before the trial describing the capture
and based entirely on the disgruntled Captain Underwood’s version of events.”
Gary D. Rowe, Constitutionalism in the Streets, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 401, 413 (2005).
234. BURTON ALVA KONKLE, GEORGE BRYAN AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA 1731-1791, at 160 (William C. Campbell ed., 1922), available at
https://archive.org/stream/georgebryanconst00konkuoft#page/n7/mode/2up.
235. Arnold, then military commander of Philadelphia, was not yet suspected of
treason. M. Ruth Kelly gives a vivid description of Arnold’s involvement in the
case, where he was already showing signs of trickery. When he was accused of
advocating for Olmstead because he had a pecuniary interest, he responded in the
newspaper, The Pennsylvania Packet, that he was interested in Olmstead’s case
only because Olmstead and his men were “countrymen and neighbours” and were
“in distress.” KELLY, supra note 46, at 46. But his investment was not a good one;
the long case and lawyers cost a substantial amount of money, and he had to
borrow money from the French consul, even trying to entice him to invest in the
case. Id. Indeed, the case of the Active is blamed in part for driving Arnold to the
“desperate measures” of treason. Id.
236. This Committee included William Henry Drayton, of South Carolina; John
Henry, Jr., of Maryland; William Ellery, of Rhode Island; and Oliver Ellsworth,
of Connecticut. Carson, supra note 224, at 388.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 388-89.
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Yet Olmstead’s victory meant little without the means to
enforce it. The ship was now in the custody of the
Pennsylvania courts, and they alone had the power to execute
the Committee’s decision. But according to Pennsylvania
law, the Committee on Appeals could hear only questions of
law; it could not review questions of fact.239 The Pennsylvania
court wrote that it took “into consideration the decree of the
court of appeals,” but after “mature consideration[,]”
determined that that the jury’s finding of the facts stood and
could not be reversed on appeal.240 Judge Ross241 of the
Pennsylvania court then issued an order and warrant to his
marshal to sell the cargo of the Active—the British ship—and
bring the money into the court, in preparation for enforcing
the jury’s verdict.242
That same day, Olmstead appeared before the
Committee on Appeals and pleaded with the Committee to
issue an injunction directing the state marshal not to follow
the order.243 The Committee issued the injunction, but the
Pennsylvania marshal disregarded it, paying all of the money
into the Pennsylvania court in staunch defiance of the
Committee’s order.244 The marshal then cheekily sent the
receipt from the Pennsylvania court to the Committee on
Appeals.245

239. 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PA. FROM 1682-1801, at 279 (WM. Stanley Ray
ed., 1903). As the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania explained it,
The genius and spirit of the common law of England, which is law in
Pennsylvania, will not suffer a sentence or judgment of the lowest Court,
founded on a general verdict, to be controlled or reversed by the highest
jurisdiction; unless for error in matter of law, apparent upon the face of
the record.
Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 Dall. 160, 163 (Pa. 1792).
240. United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 120 (1809).
241. Judge Ross was one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence.
Carson, supra note 224, at 387-88.
242. Treacy, supra note 225, at 678.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Carson, supra note 224, at 389-90.
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The Committee was enraged, but powerless. On January
19, 1779, the Committee issued an order declaring that the
“marshal of the court of admiralty of the state of
Pennsylvania had absolutely and respectively refused
obedience to the decree and writ regularly made in and
issued from this court, to which they and each of them was
bound to pay obedience.”246 The Committee (referring to itself
as “the court”) was thus “unwilling to enter upon any
proceedings for contempt, lest consequences might ensure at
this juncture dangerous to the public peace of the United
States . . . .”247 The Committee refused to proceed further, or
hear any appeals “until the authority of this court be so
settled as to give full efficacy to their decrees and process.”248
The subtext was plain: any further action by the Committee
might lead to civil war.
Two months later, Congress purported to reassert the
Committee’s jurisdiction to review factual questions as well
as questions of law, stating that no finding of a jury or court
could oust Congress of its appellate jurisdiction.249 The power
of executing the law of nations fell within the rights of a
sovereign, and the power to hear appeals was necessary to
apply that law uniformly.250 Even though Olmstead was a
domestic matter, Congress used it as an occasion to assert
that failure to enforce its decisions would prevent Congress
from satisfying the claims of foreign countries.251
But without Pennsylvania’s cooperation, the resolutions
lacked bite. On two occasions, Congress appointed
committees to meet with a committee of the Pennsylvania
legislature, but to little avail. Wilson and Lewis—along with
several other members of Congress—suggested that
246. United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 122-23 (1809).
247. Id. at 123.
248. Id.
249. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 107.
250. See 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 61, at 509.
Interestingly, it appears that this was “the only occasion on which a claim of
‘sovereignty’ was officially made on behalf of the Continental Congress . . . .”
Treacy, supra note 225, at 680.
251. Treacy, supra note 225, at 679.
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Congress itself pay what was owed to Olmstead and charge
it to Pennsylvania, but this proposal was sidelined.252 In the
end, Pennsylvania and Congress could not agree.253 It was not
until thirty years later that Olmstead got relief, this time in
the Supreme Court.254
Inspired in part by the Olmstead matter,255 in August of
1779, a committee began planning for the freestanding Court
of Appeals.256 The initial committee report called for dividing
the United States into four districts, with a different Court of
Appeals for each district.257 That proposal would have given
each court more enforcement powers, including a marshal,
and “all the powers of courts of record for fining and
imprisoning for contempt and disobedience.”258 Further, the
committee recommended that juries be abolished in Prize
Cases.259 Interestingly, the committee plan would have
deprived the appellate courts of jurisdiction in cases where
the appellant was from the same state where the trial was
held—the “converse” of diversity jurisdiction.260 Tweaked by
motions and amendments, the bill eventually came up for a
vote and failed in an even split.261
After the failure of the initial plan for a Court of Appeals,
Congress appointed a new committee—which included Oliver
252. See 16 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 273-74
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1780); see also 15 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
1774-1789, at 1195-96 (Worthington Chauncey Ford. ed., 1780). As Wilson had
represented Olmstead on appeal, it is difficult not to see this as a conflict of
interest.
253. Treacy, supra note 225, at 680-82.
254. See United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 141 (1809).
255. Other factors, such as complaints from merchants, also likely inspired the
Court. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
256. GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 169.
257. Id.
258. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 114.
259. Id. at 116. Pennsylvania and South Carolina did pass a new law disposing
of juries in admiralty cases, but the remainder of the states who used juries
continued to do so. Id.
260. See 15 JOURNALS
252, at 1221.

OF THE

CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, supra note

261. GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 170.
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Ellsworth—that proposed the more modest plan Congress
ultimately adopted.262 Although the new plan also abolished
juries, it failed to give the Court its own marshal or any
powers of contempt.263 Instead, Congress only advised states
to pass laws “directing the admiralty courts to carry into full
and speedy execution the final decrees of the Court of
Appeals.”264
Why would Congress—still embroiled in the difficulties
of enforcing the Olmstead case—fail to give its new Court the
power to remedy one of the Committee’s most obvious
shortcomings? Although the Articles of Confederation,
approved by Congress in 1777, had provided Congress the
power to establish courts for determining appeals in cases of
capture, the Articles were not ratified until 1781—after the
Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture had already been
established.265 Congress, well aware of the fragile state of the
Confederacy, likely felt that it did not have a “clear
constitutional mandate” to establish the court, and was
therefore hesitant to consolidate its power.266
In 1781, however, Madison raised the issue again,
seeking to give the new prize court the ability to enforce its
decisions. Madison proposed resolutions recommending that
that “the states be called upon to order their respective
marshals to carry into immediate execution of the decrees of
judgment of the said Court under the penalty of
dismission . . . and action for damages in the Courts of
common law at the suit of the party injured.”267 He cast about
for anything that might make the judges appear more
authoritative; one of his proposed resolutions required that
the judges be “complimented with a black robe by the United
States as proper to appear in during the sitting of the
262. Id. at 170-71.
263. Id.
264. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 115. For more background on the founding
of the Court of Appeals, see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
265. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 115.
266. Id.
267. 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 374-75
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1781).
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Courts.”268 A committee studying Madison’s proposals would
have extended the Court’s jurisdiction even further, giving
the Court the power of contempt and to appoint marshals.269
But Congress again declined to adopt resolutions granting
the Court more authority, ultimately granting the Court no
more authority than it already had.270
Yet many of Madison’s ideas for the Court of Appeals
were later recycled in the Constitution and the Judiciary Act.
For example, the Judiciary Act created the office of the
federal marshal, granting the marshal the power to “execute
throughout the District, all lawful precepts directed to him,
and issued under the authority of the United States.”271 These
concerns about the lack of federal marshals loyal to the
national judiciary were underscored by the Prize Case
experience. As the Olmstead case illustrated, state marshals
naturally felt more allegiance to the state court than to a
congressional appellate body; in the face of conflicting
rulings, the marshal would obey the government who paid
his salary.272 Unsurprisingly, the appointment of federal
marshals was another means of ensuring that the federal
courts made up for the shortcomings of the Court of Appeals.
In addition, the allowance for inferior courts in the
Constitution helped mitigate the enforcement difficulties the
Framers had faced in the Prize Cases. The competing option
for inferior courts at the Convention had been proposals to
keep the state courts as the “inferior courts” of the Supreme
Court, an idea that carried until Madison proposed giving
Congress the power to decide.273 But with inferior federal
268. Id. at 375.
269. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 129.
270. Id.
271. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87.
272. See GOEBEL, supra note 11, at 159 (noting that “[t]here is no evidence that
Congress undertook in any appeal to enlist the marshals of the state courts to
execute its orders.”).
273. The Paterson plan presented at the Constitutional Convention, for
example, left litigation at the trial level to the state courts. 1 Farrand, Records,
supra note 86, at 20-21; see also Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 10
(explaining that “there was strong sentiment in the Convention to leave all
litigation at the trial stage to the state courts”).
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courts, the Framers would not have to rely on state courts to
execute their decisions; the lower courts, buttressed by
federal marshals, could act without the states needing to be
involved at all. In addition to allowing federal control over
both judges and juries, inferior federal courts offered the
opportunity for the federal government to have complete
control over the enforcement of its decisions—a key
requirement for making diversity jurisdiction work.
This emphasis on control and enforcement helps resolve
at least one puzzle of diversity jurisdiction: if diversity
jurisdiction was intended to alleviate geographic bias, why
did the first Congress allow a plaintiff in a diversity suit to
file in federal court in his home state?274 Presumably, a
plaintiff would get a fair hearing—or better—in his own state
courts. The enforcement difficulties Congress grappled with
during the Prize Cases provide one clue. In the absence of
inferior federal courts, a plaintiff may trust his home state
courts to decide the disputes, and indeed prefer his home
state court against an out-of-state or foreign litigant. But if
he wins in his home court, he may still need to execute the
decision against his opponent in the opponent’s home state.
Offering that plaintiff the option of a federal forum in his own
home state erases these difficulties; an interstate community
of federal marshals assists in the enforcement of a decision
outside his state if he prevails.
Arguably, the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit
Clause should have remedied any enforcement concerns, by
requiring the states to routinely enforce each other’s
274. Robert Jones lays out the puzzle: “[t]he logic of the ‘impartiality’
justification is that out-of-state parties would suffer from state court bias in favor
of in-state parties.” Jones, supra note 22, at 1006. Therefore, it makes sense that
an out-of-state party can remove to federal court to protect against bias from the
home jury. “Conversely,” Jones suggests, “one would not expect the in-state
party—who would likely benefit from the purported bias—to be able to invoke
diversity jurisdiction.” Id. “In-state parties—the supposed beneficiaries of ‘local
prejudice’ in the state courts—were thus allowed to invoke federal jurisdiction
when suing or defending against an out-of-state party.” Id. The question is: why?
Judge Posner, among others, offered the reason that geographic bias must have
played a lesser role in the minds of the Framers. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 141 (1985). We argue, however, that
permitting in-state parties to invoke federal jurisdiction is consistent with the
geographic bias theory.

2015]

THE PRIZE CASES

527

judgments.275 But although the modern understanding of the
Clause is that—as the Supreme Court has said—a judgment
in a state court “gains nationwide force[,]”276 this was not
likely the understanding of the clause at the Founding.
Recall that the Full Faith and Credit Clause in Article
IV, § 1 has two parts. The first part provides that “Full
[F]aith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State.”277
This first, self-executing sentence of the Clause, Stephen
Sachs has argued, “was evidentiary in nature: it obliged
states to admit sister-state records into evidence but did not
mandate the substantive effect those records should have.”278
In other words, states were merely required to admit the
judgment into evidence, not enforce it as they would their
own decisions. This view is consistent with the
understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the
Articles of Confederation, which again, did not
“contemplate[ ] anything like interstate res judicata.”279
The second part of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
allows Congress to “prescribe the Manner in which such acts,
records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect
thereof.”280 But this too does not suggest that the Framers
had more sweeping intentions for the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Sachs argues that even when the First Congress
passed a statute under this clause, “there is substantial
evidence that the Act’s central purpose was to declare the
mode of authentication”—or, in other words, the way the
275. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.
276. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
277. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.
278. Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L.
REV. 1201, 1206 (2009); see also David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and
Credit, 118 YALE L.J. 1584, 1588 (2009) (noting that “almost no one in the
Founding generation had opined [that ‘full faith and credit’] could mean anything
more than evidentiary sufficiency . . .”).
279. Engdahl, supra note 278, at 1610 (2009). The Articles of Confederation
provided that “[f]ull faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the
records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other
State.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 3.
280. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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documents should be presented to the court.281 Not everyone
agrees with this narrow view of what the initial clause
meant,282 but the lack of clarity gives reason to doubt that the
Framers foresaw that states would henceforth automatically
enforce each other’s judgments. Placing diversity jurisdiction
in the inferior courts, and accompanying those courts with a
national network of federal marshals, was a far more reliable
means than the Full Faith and Credit Clause of enforcing
judgments in interstate litigation.
In short, the Prize Cases taught the Framers important
lessons about how federal courts with diversity jurisdiction
could mitigate the geographic bias they encountered in the
Prize Cases, lessons whose influence went beyond the
Constitution to the Judiciary Act. By granting the Supreme
Court broad jurisdiction over issues of fact, ensuring control
over federal judges and juries, and providing that the federal
courts had the power to enforce its decisions, the Framers
used their own judicial experience to devise a formula for a
federal jurisdiction that would avoid the mistakes of the past.
IV. WHY THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRIZE CASES EXTENDS
BEYOND ADMIRALTY
Did the Prize Cases—a seemingly obscure genre of
litigation—actually exercise this level of influence over the
Framers? Scholars who have shown awareness of bias in the
Prize Cases have generally thought not. Friendly, for
example,283 claimed that the influence of the Cases was
limited to inspiring federal court jurisdiction over admiralty
cases.284 Like Friendly, scholars of the sources of diversity
281. Sachs, supra note 278, at 1233.
282. See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of Full Faith and Credit,
20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 485, 485 (2013) (arguing that “the command given to the
states in the Full Faith and Credit Clause was originally understood to be robust
and meaningful.”).
283. Friendly, supra note 3, at 484 n.6, 500.
284. As Holt summarizes, contemporaries “presumably understood the
problems of localism that the national experience with admiralty had presented
during the Confederation and shared the general attitude of 1789 that admiralty
jurisdiction should be an exclusively national matter.” Holt, The Invention of the
Federal Courts, supra note 24, at 1430.
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jurisdiction have assumed that the problems faced in the
Prize Cases arose solely from the unusual nature of
admiralty litigation.285
But why limit the analysis to admiralty alone? First of
all, the Framers—surely to their annoyance—were
intimately aware of the problems of bias the Prize Cases
raised. Ellsworth, the drafter of the Judiciary Act and future
Supreme Court Justice, was one of the Framers’ most
involved members in the Prize Cases. Ellsworth had
adjudicated nine cases286 and actively helped establish the
Court of Appeals;287 he also presented a report to Congress
condemning Pennsylvania in the Olmstead case. Wilson, also
a Supreme Court Justice, was the acknowledged leader of the
Committee of Detail at the Convention, which revised the
Constitution; the “ten days of the [the Committee of Detail’s]
deliberations are . . . in certain respects perhaps the most
important episode of the entire Convention.”288 Therefore, the
same man who re-drafted the Constitution acted as a lawyer
in six Prize Cases, and as a judge in at least ten;289 the Court
285. Indeed, at least one of the Framers did think that the Prize Cases were
anomalies. During the debates on the Judiciary Act, Samuel Livermore sought to
limit federal court jurisdiction to admiralty, arguing that
we have supported the Union for thirteen or fourteen years without such
courts, from which I infer that they are not necessary, or we should have
discovered the inconvenience of being without them; yet I believe
Congress have always had ample justice done in all their claim; at least
as I said before, I never heard any complaint, except the case of an appeal
on a capture.
Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early
Implementation of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 1515, 1534 (1986). Even this opponent of broad jurisdiction recognized the
defects in the Prize Cases.
286. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 329.
287. See William Garrott Brown, A Continental Congressman: Oliver Ellsworth
1777-1783, 10 AM. HIST. REV. 751, 761 (1905) (“By his share in creating [the Court
of Appeals in Cases of Capture] Ellsworth—no doubt unwittingly—had been
training his hand for the noblest task it ever found to do; and in his membership
of the committee which preceded it he had an experience which must have proved
of value in the highest office he was ever to hold.”).
288. William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 901, 931 (2008).
289. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 329.
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of Appeals in Cases of Capture was partly his idea. Edmund
Randolph, whose proposal for the judiciary was the only to
specify that the federal judiciary should have jurisdiction
over suits between citizens of different states, had also been
involved in a number of appeals. Although Madison did not
adjudicate any prize appeals, he did initiate attempts to
reinforce the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals when state
courts refused to give effect to its decisions.290
And indeed, every member of Congress must, at some
point, have been aware of the Prize Cases and the issues they
raised. Over the course of the forty-two appeals heard when
the Committee was active, thirty-seven members of Congress
sat on the Committee of Appeals.291 And the entire Congress
would have been aware of problems in the Prize Cases, even
if not directly involved with the Committee. For example,
Congress debated a resolution bolstering the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals for two days.292 And while not every
member of the Constitutional Convention was on the
Continental Congress, at least forty out of the fifty-five
men—and likely more—would have been at least made
aware of the Court’s problems.293
It therefore seems unlikely that Congress cabined its
Prize Case experience to admiralty. Many of the same
concerns that justified federal admiralty jurisdiction also
applied to diversity cases. At the Convention, James Wilson
said that “admiralty jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to
the national Government, as it related to cases not within the
jurisdiction of particular states, [and] to a scene in which
controversies with foreigners would be most likely to

290. See supra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
291. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 90.
292. See Brown, supra note 287, at 760.
293. See Teiser, supra note 28, at 415 (“It is reasonable to suppose, therefore,
that forty of the delegates participating in the framing of the Constitution, or
about four-fifths of them, were more or less intimately familiar with the
functioning of the Committee on Appeals of Congress and with its successor the
Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture.”).
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happen.”294 The need to regulate disputes involving
foreigners, and between citizens of different states, counseled
in favor of placing both admiralty and diversity in the federal
courts.
Moreover, proposals similar to diversity jurisdiction first
arose in discussions over the Prize Cases. Recall that when
Congress first set up the Court of Appeals in Cases of
Capture, it was initially proposed that the Court would not
have jurisdiction if a “[p]arty who prays an appeal be a
subject or inhabitant of the State where the trial was had in
the Court of Admiralty.”295 Similarly, when the report was
debated in Congress, a new proposal was made to oust
appellate jurisdiction “in any case where all the parties
concerned are citizens of one and the same State, unless
allowed by the legislature of the said State.”296 Members of
Congress were already thinking about diversity jurisdiction,
albeit in the converse; rather than granting jurisdiction over
cases between citizens of different states and foreigners, they
considered exempting appeals from those whose trial took
place in their home state, or cases where both parties were
from the same state. These proposals failed to pass,297 but
they show that the Congressmen were thinking about
geography as an element in determining federal jurisdiction
long before the drafting of the Constitution.
Furthermore, to the extent the Framers were concerned
about the viability of commercial litigation, the Prize Cases
offered the best available evidence of what interstate
commercial litigation might look like in the new United
States. Before the War, there was, as John Frank has pointed
out, “too little significant interstate business litigation to give
room for serious actual abrasion.”298 But the Prize Cases
were, in many ways, similar to ordinary commercial
litigation between diverse parties: both commercial litigation
294. DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 AS REPORTED BY JAMES
MADISON, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION
OF THE AMERICAN STATES, 69th Cong., H.R. DOC. NO. 398, 158 (1927).
295. 15 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 252, at 1221.
296. 16 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 252, at 29.
297. Id. at 29-30; see also 15 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra
note 252, at 1221.
298. Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 24.
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and the Prize Cases involved substantial sums of money. The
Prize Cases dangled thousands of pounds before privateers
at a time when Americans—and the colonies that stood to
gain from the capture—were particularly cash-strapped.
Whether or not the potential for interstate or international
hostility was glaring in ordinary commercial litigation, it was
obvious in the Prize Cases.
The Prize Cases looked closer to commercial litigation
than our admiralty cases of today in another key respect: the
involvement of juries.299 Although admiralty cases are
generally not decided by juries today,300 at the start of the
Committee on Appeals, Congress was insistent on a right to
a jury trial in a prize case. One of the key crimes of the British
in the eyes of Americans before the War was that the British
Vice-Admiralty courts did not use juries when adjudicating
disputes over the hated trade regulations.301 For their part,
the British did not believe that American juries could decide
trade or taxation cases fairly. Before the Revolution, the
colonial governor of Massachusetts, Francis Bernard, said
that juries “‘in these causes were not to be trusted’” and that
no one “‘will take upon him to declare, that at this time an
American jury is impartial and indifferent enough, to
determine equally upon frauds of trade.’”302 Acts granting
admiralty courts increased powers “gave a larger jurisdiction
to admiralty courts in America than had ever been given to

299. Lovejoy, supra note 54, at 465 (“Americans were distinguished from their
cousins in England and were subject to a different judicial system—one that
deprived them, they said, of trial by jury. But Americans escaped any serious
difficulty over admiralty jurisdiction until after the French and Indian War when
Parliament levied taxes on the colonists and used admiralty courts to see that
they were paid.”).
300. The Seventh Amendment jury trial right only applies to “[s]uits at common
law,” which does not include most admiralty jurisdiction. See Margaret L. Moses,
What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Seventh Amendment
Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 187 (2000).
301. Lovejoy, supra note 54, at 462.
302. Id. at 468 (quoting Letter from Francis Bernard (Nov. 10, 1764), in SELECT
LETTERS ON THE TRADE AND GOVERNMENT OF AMERICA 13, 16-17 (London, 1774)).

2015]

THE PRIZE CASES

533

the same courts in England,” thus depriving Americans of
jury trials in more cases than their British counterparts.303
Presumably to remedy this flaw, the Continental
Congress had initially required states to use juries in
admiralty cases—making the cases look procedurally more
like commercial cases than today’s admiralty cases.304 But
although the juries in Prize Cases—as Matthew Harrington
has said—“certainly neutralized much of the invective hurled
against the old vice-admiralty courts,” Congress encountered
a “whole new set of problems” when state court juries
abandoned the principles of the law of nations in favor of
bias.305
So, there is ample circumstantial evidence that the Prize
Cases motivated diversity jurisdiction. But why didn’t the
Framers reveal the Cases’ influence in the debates? As
described earlier, Wilson did use the Prize Cases to justify
the grant of jurisdiction over law and fact in the Continental
Congress.306 Yet there was so little debate on diversity at the
Convention that not much was said about the justifications
for diversity at all. And, arguably, the need for diversity was
so obvious among those who had witnessed the federal-state
struggles in the Prize Cases that it went without saying.
When Madison said, “[w]e well know, sir, that foreigners can
not get justice done them in these [state] courts,” perhaps
“we well know” referred, at least in part, to a shared
understanding of the difficulties in the Prize Cases.307

303. Id. at 462.
304. Later, they regretted this decision. See supra notes 255-64 and
accompanying text.
305. Harrington, Economic Origins, supra note 178, at 177.
306. See supra Part III.A.
307. 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 583. Robert Clinton has made this
broader point with regard to the Prize Cases and the establishment of a national
judiciary. See Clinton, Guided Quest, supra note 26, at 757 (“[T]he experience
under these national adjudicatory procedures during the confederation period
undoubtedly shaped the attitudes of the delegates who attended the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787 and serves
to explain the relative consensus surrounding the need for the establishment of a
constitutionally created, standing, independent, national judiciary.”).
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Diversity jurisdiction was contentious, however, during
the ratification debates, where the Federalists defended
diversity as a means of mitigating geographic bias. The Prize
Cases were mentioned at least once in this context to
highlight jury bias. In the South Carolina ratification
debates, General Charles Coatsworth Pinckney responded to
concerns about the Constitution’s lack of an explicit right to
a civil jury trial by referring to the Prize Cases. He explained
that Congress had “passed an ordinance requiring all causes
of capture to be decided by juries: this was contrary to the
practice of all nations, and we knew it; but still an
attachment to a trial by jury induced the experiment.”308 The
experiment was a disaster. Pinckney noted that
[t]he property of our friends was, at times, condemned
indiscriminately with the property of our enemies, and the property
of our citizens of one state by the juries of another. Some of our
citizens have severely felt these inconveniences. Citizens of other
states and other powers experienced similar misfortunes from this
mode of trial.309

Therefore, he continued, Congress put juries aside in
cases of capture, a decision it was only able to make because
the right to jury trial was a resolution of Congress, and not a
right guaranteed by the Articles of Confederation. 310
Pinckney used this example to show that it was unwise to
give a sweeping right to a civil jury in every case in the
Constitution, when “representatives of the people” would be
better placed to decide the scope of the right.311
Finally, the Prize Cases may not have been invoked more
often because the Framers had to present their views to a
broader audience. Though vitally important to the
Revolution, the Prize Cases involved an obscure body of the
law that “touched the lives of few people.”312 The Court’s
decisions were unpopular with the states whose judgments
308. 4 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 307.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 307-08.
311. Id. at 308.
312. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 337.
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were overruled,313 and the subject matter was “too arcane to
catch the popular imagination.”314 Justifying the Diversity
Clause with more abstract references to bias may have been
more effective than invoking Congress’s judicial experience,
an experience few knew about, and others hated. As Robert
Jones has pointed out, the Framers were, after all, “skilled
propagandists.”315
V. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AS A CRISIS-AVOIDING MEASURE
The Prize Cases also taught that mitigating geographic
bias through diversity jurisdiction, might, in fact, be
essential to the nation’s survival. The Framers frequently
faced situations where state court decisions evidencing bias
against foreign countries could lead to crisis, and even war.
For example, several Prize Cases threatened the fragile
allegiances between the new Nation and France and Spain,
countries the United States desperately needed as allies.
From this experience, we conclude that the Framers learned
that alienage jurisdiction—jurisdiction over “controversies
. . . between . . . Citizens . . . and foreign States, Citizens or
Subject,” which is often included under the broader umbrella
of “diversity”—could avoid serious foreign confrontations.
But they also learned that jurisdiction over disputes between
citizens of different states could help avoid domestic crises
that were consistently threatened in the new Republic.
A. Avoiding Foreign Wars
Throughout the Revolutionary War, the Framers found
themselves repeatedly entangled in Prize disputes with
international dimensions.316 Juries were not just biased
313. See Jennings v. Carson, 8 U.S. 2, 9 (1807) (noting argument of appellant
counsel that “[t]he federal court of appeals was unpopular in those states who
were attached to the trial by jury, and its jurisdiction was opposed with great
warmth.”).
314. Swindler, supra note 28, at 514.
315. Jones, supra note 22, at 1009.
316. Although this Article primarily focuses on privateering along the American
coast, privateering also took place in Europe, with distribution of prizes
happening in European courts. This privateering made alliances with European
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against citizens of other states; foreigners lost out in state
admiralty courts, too. Resolving international disputes on
appeal became one of Congress’s primary roles in its judicial
capacity on the Committee on Appeals, a role that was tinged
with diplomacy. Consequently, when framing diversity
jurisdiction, the members of the Convention were already
well acquainted with the need for a federal forum not just for
citizens of different states, but for aliens as well.
The Framers knew that international conflicts could
arise from unfairly adjudicated legal disputes. Poorly
handled state court Prize decisions posed particular
difficulties during the War, when Congress desperately
needed allies. Early in the War, foreign nations complained
about American privateers attacking neutral ships.
Benjamin Franklin and the other American Commissioners
in Paris sent out a circular to the states, warning that
“[c]omplaint having been made of violences done by
American armed vessels to neutral nations,” states must
“respect the rights of neutrality . . . and treat all neutral ships
with the utmost kindness and friendship for the honor of your
country and of yourselves.”317
Yet American privateers continued to attack neutral
ships. Massachusetts was a repeat offender,318 embroiling
Congress in numerous battles over the seizure of foreign
ships. Because Massachusetts law initially precluded
appeals to Congress, the Committee on Appeals was
powerless in these cases. In 1779, for example, two Spanish
ships were captured by Massachusetts privateers;319 although
countries particularly helpful. The alliance with France was especially crucial for
the privateering effort, as Greene says, because “[t]he commerce-destroying
operations of the American navy and American privateers could now be carried
on freely from French ports, unhampered by neutrality regulations.” GREENE,
supra note 44, at 491.
317. Letter from Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane & Arthur Lee to Captains of
American Armed Vessels (Nov. 21, 1777), in 2 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 425, 425 (Francis Warton ed., 1889).
318. To be fair to Massachusetts, it adjudicated the bulk of Prize Cases during
the War, which is perhaps one reason why it ran into so many disputes with
foreign citizens.
319. Bias might have been particularly prevalent against the Spanish, who had
angered the Americans by allowing the British to resupply their troops in New
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the Massachusetts court adjudicated one of the ships as
neutral, it condemned the cargos of both ships as British
property.320 The Spanish minister, through the French
minister, Conrad Alexandre Gerard, conveyed to Congress
that he sought “to obtain all the satisfaction due to the honor
of the flag of his Catholic majesty, his master,” in enforcing
the treaty of alliance and commerce between Spain and
America.321 (He also requested that judges be “punished who
have unjustly condemned and sentenced as a lawful prize the
said cargo . . . .”322)
In response to the Spanish complaint, a congressional
committee noted that “it is very difficult for injured
Foreigners to obtain redress in [s]uch cases as the present by
a due court of law,” and suggested that Congress “take the
most effectual measures” to have the privateers repay the
owners of the captured ships.323 Congress also responded to
the French minister, reassuring him that the United States
would follow the law of nations, but at the same time
explaining that it could not interfere with the court process.324
Tellingly, Congress also deleted several paragraphs from its
first draft of the letter explaining the difficulties the newly
federal appeals system was having.325 At Congress’s
encouragement, Massachusetts did pass an act allowing

York using the Mississippi River, which was under Spanish control. See
BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 231.
320. Id. at 305.
321. Don Juan Miralles, Memorial Respecting Two Spanish Vessels (Apr. 21,
1779), in 3 THE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 317, at 135.
322. Id. John Jay responded that “[t]he Importance of the Subject, as well as the
Respect due to the Applications of their good & great Ally, will, I am persuaded,
induce Congress to place it among the first Objects of their Attention.” Letter of
John Jay to Conrad Alexandre Gerard (Apr. 25, 1779), in 12 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 381, 381 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1985).
323. William Henry Drayton’s Draft Committee Report (July 10, 1779), in 13
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 183, 183 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1986).
324. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 16, at 306.
325. Id.
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appeals to Congress where the owners of the captured ship
claimed it was from a friendly nation.326
But that was not the end of the international conflicts. In
1781, a Massachusetts privateering ship, the Sally, captured
a Portuguese ship, Nostra Seigniora da Solidade e St. Miguel
e Almas.327 Ultimately, a jury awarded the ship to the
Portuguese, but the cargo to the Americans.328 The Court of
Appeals ruled that the ship and cargo both belonged to the
Portuguese, yet the Portuguese were still unable to get their
ship back.329
The next year, another Massachusetts privateer
captured a Spanish ship below New Orleans, the St. Antonio,
even though it was flying neutral flags.330 The Massachusetts
privateers brought the ship from New Orleans to Boston, 331
violating the general rule that ships should be libeled at a
convenient port,332 likely aware of the favorable treatment
they would receive in their home state of Massachusetts. In
Boston, where the ship was libeled, the state court upheld the
capture;333 the Court of Appeals reversed.334 The privateers
326. Id. at 307.
327. Id. at 230.
328. Id.
329. Id. The Portuguese ship did eventually receive some partial enforcement of
favorable decisions, but only when it resorted to common law remedies. See id. at
228 (“This case . . . does suggest that litigants might turn to the common law
courts in a quasi in rem proceeding to attempt to have the captured property or
its value restored, even after a decree of the judges of appeals had awarded it to
them. Such an action at common law would be unnecessary if the decree of the
appellate court were fully executed in admiralty.”).
330. Id. at 231-32 (“Here was a glaring example justifying the fears that local
juries in admiralty cases could involve the United States in serious international
incidents.”).
331. Id. at 231.
332. Id. at 55.
333. Id. at 232. Interestingly, the Massachusetts privateer brought the ship
from New Orleans to Boston, violating the general rule that ships should be
libeled at a convenient port. See id. at 55, 231. Likely, the privateers were aware
of the favorable treatment they would receive in their home state of
Massachusetts.
334. Id. at 233. The Committee did, however, affirm the decision in part,
because it appeared that some of the cargo was British property.
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who had captured the Spanish ship then wrote to Congress,
claiming that the appellate decision was prejudiced by letters
from the Spanish officials, and requesting a rehearing.335
Around the same time, Congress learned from the Spanish
that Massachusetts was refusing to enforce the Court of
Appeals’ decision in the St. Antonio case.336 A committee of
Congress determined that the privateers’ complaint had no
merit, but there was little Congress could do.337 Congress
could again only recommend to Massachusetts that it respect
the Committee on Appeals’ decision.338 It is unclear whether
the owners of the Spanish ships ever had their decision
enforced.339
This kind of bias against foreign parties, exacerbated by
the state courts’ refusal to enforce federal appellate
decisions, was a particular problem throughout the Prize
Cases. These cases exposed the Framers to the prospect of
international strife resulting from biased state court
decisions. In the constitutional debates, the Federalists
emphasized that the proposed federal courts would be a safe
place for international disputes. Madison said at the
Constitutional Convention: “[a]s our intercourse with foreign
nations will be affected by decisions of this kind, they ought
to be uniform. This can only be done by giving the federal
judiciary exclusive jurisdiction.”340 John Jay argued that, in
a federal judiciary, treaties and “laws of nations, will always
be expounded in one sense, and executed in the same
manner,” unlike the state courts where the decisions of the
“thirteen States . . . will not always accord or be consistent;”

335. Id.
336. See id. at 234.
337. See id.
338. Id.
339. Id. (“Once again Congress, by this recommendation, had to implicitly admit
its impotence to assure full justice in prize cases without the free cooperation of
the states—and cooperation of the states was never an item in abundance.”).
340. 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 485.
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particularly as they might be affected by “different local laws
and interests.”341
The Prize Case experience also warned that the shoddy
application of international law by undiplomatic state
institutions342 could have disastrous consequences.
Jurisdiction over alienage cases was essential to maintaining
friendly diplomatic relations and avoiding foreign wars.
When speaking of alienage jurisdiction, Madison asked,
“[c]ould there be a more favorable or eligible provision to
avoid controversies with foreign powers? Ought it to be put
in the power of a member of the union to drag the whole
community into war?”343 The Framers invoked this fear of
war explicitly in the debates. Hamilton wrote in The
Federalist Papers that federal jurisdiction over “all causes in
which the citizens of other countries are concerned” was
essential to the “public faith” and “the security of the public
tranquility.”344 James Wilson also defended alienage

341. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 15 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Pinckney said that the federal judiciary was “the most important and intricate
part of the system.” He continued, “[i]t is equally true that, in order to insure the
administration of justice, it was necessary to give it all the powers, original as
well as appellate, the Constitution has enumerated; without it we could not expect
a due observance of treaties.” 4 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 257-58. See also
Douglas J. Sylvester, International Law As Sword or Shield? Early American
Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 27 (1999)
(contending that Randolph’s argument that the Articles of Confederation were
deficient because “no treaty or treaties among the whole or part of the States, as
individual Sovereignties, would be sufficient . . . was widely held and formed a
strong conceptual component behind federal jurisdiction”).
342. See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International
Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 961 (2010) (“The field of foreign affairs was
new ground for most of the men in the state governments. Even those with
experience in colonial government or overseas trade had rarely dealt with the
formalities of foreign policy, which previously had been handled by British
imperial agents, almost all of whom remained loyal to the empire.”).
343. 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 486.
344. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge
ed., 1889).
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jurisdiction as a way to “preserve peace with foreign
nations.”345
This view of alienage jurisdiction as a crisis-avoiding
measure is consistent with another justification for alienage:
assuaging foreign creditors. Wythe Holt focuses on the
colonists’ enormous debts to British creditors in the postRevolutionary War period as the source of alienage
jurisdiction.346 Because of a mixture of British hostility and
financial insolvency, Holt points out, “every state legislature
during, and several after, the [W]ar passed at least some kind
of statute restricting the power of at least some British
creditors to collect.”347 State courts followed the legislatures,
too, and refused to hear cases from British creditors during
the War.348 British merchants were “amazed”349 that the
Americans were refusing to abide by Article IV of the Treaty
of Paris, which provided that creditors would “‘meet with no
lawful impediment’” in claiming their debts.350 Establishing
national courts that were free from biased state institutions
was the solution.351 Following the passage of the Judiciary
Act, “British creditors immediately began filing cases in the

345. 2 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 491-93. Similarly, William Davie of
North Carolina remarked that, “[i]f our courts of justice did not decide in favor of
foreign citizens and subjects when they ought, it might involve the whole Union
in a war[.]” But he also added that, “of controversies between the citizens or
subjects of foreign states and the citizens of the United States . . . were left to the
decision of particular states, it would be in their power, at any time, to involve
the continent in a war, usually the greatest of all national calamities.” 4 Elliot’s
Debates, supra note 87, at 158-59.
346. Holt, The Origins of Alienage Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 551, 562-64.
347. Id. at 559-60.
348. Id. at 561-62.
349. Id. at 561.
350. Id. at 554-55 (quoting Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3,
1783, 9 stat. 80, 82.
351. Id. at 562. The Framers explicitly invoked this rationale in the debates.
Wilson, for example, called for an “impartial tribunal” that could “restore either
public or private credit” for foreigners. 2 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 491.
Madison said that “foreigners cannot get justice done them in these [state] courts,
and [that] this has prevented many wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing
among us.” 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 583.
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national courts in what southerners thought was a flood, but
which to the merchants was merely a trickle.”352
The Prize Case experience naturally overlaps with the
Framers’ concerns about foreign creditors’ ability to collect
their debts. Both in the Prize Cases and in disputes with
British creditors over the states’ disregard for Article IV of
the Treaty of Paris, the Framers found it difficult to secure
compliance with the nation’s international obligations, or
treat international disputes uniformly. Seemingly local
events with individual foreign citizens could take on an
international dimension, just as failure to pay foreign debts
might, as Holt warns, “embroil the weak fledgling nation in
war.”353
B. Domestic War
But Congress also feared a domestic war arising from
Prize disputes. The dramatic end of the Olmstead case
exemplifies that fear. Although these events admittedly
happened after the ratification of the Constitution, they give
credence to the concerns of the Framers and their
contemporaries that inter-state disputes—like international
disputes—could spiral into armed conflict.
Though the Committee on Appeals had ruled in
Olmstead’s favor in 1778 against the Pennsylvania
privateers, Olmstead still had not received his prize by
1790.354 After David Rittenhouse, the Pennsylvania state
treasurer and celebrated astronomer, died, his heirs and
executrices held the funds from the Active in the form of
federal debt; they refused to give it to Olmstead.355 Olmstead
won a default judgment in the Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
rejected his claim in 1792, arguing that the lower court
lacked jurisdiction to issue a default in an admiralty case.356
352. Holt, The Origins of Alienage, supra note 30, at 563-64.
353. Id. at 562.
354. Douglas, supra note 225, at 5-7.
355. Id. at 6-9.
356. Id. at 7.
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In 1803, Olmstead went instead to the new federal
district court in Pennsylvania and obtained a decree against
the heirs.357 But the Pennsylvania legislature sided with its
state courts, rejecting the federal district court’s decision and
declaring that the jurisdiction of the Committee on Appeals
had been illegal and void.358 The legislators ordered the
governor to use all means to protect Pennsylvania’s rights.359
As Hampton Carson has written, the nominal parties to the
controversy were Olmstead and Rittenhouse’s heirs—“an old
man of eighty-two and two women who had inherited the
lawsuit, but the real contestants were the State of
Pennsylvania and the United States.”360
Still empty-handed, Olmstead next took his case to the
new United States Supreme Court, where Chief Justice
Marshall upheld the authority of the congressional court.361
Chief Justice Marshall granted an order of mandamus, and
took the opportunity to reaffirm the dominance of the federal
judiciary over the state. “If the legislatures of the several
states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the
United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those
judgments,” Marshall wrote, “the [C]onstitution itself
becomes a solemn mockery.”362
But, standing alone, the Chief Justice’s stern words were
not enough to secure the primacy of the federal courts. The
federal marshal sent to enforce the decision found
Pennsylvania state militia under the command of General
Bright, appointed by the governor to uphold the legislature’s
pledge of protection to the Rittenhouse heirs.363 The marshal
357. Id.
358. Id. at 8.
359. Id.
360. Carson, supra note 224, at 394.
361. Douglas, supra note 225, at 8-9.
362. United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809). Justice Marshall
continued: “[s]o fatal a result must be deprecated by all; and the people of
Pennsylvania, not less than the citizens of every other state, must feel a deep
interest in resisting principles so destructive of the union, and in averting
consequences so fatal to themselves.” Id.
363. Carson, supra note 224, at 395.
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read his commission to the armed soldiers surrounding the
house of the Rittenhouse women, but to no avail; the
marshal’s attempts to enter the house were met with
“pointed bayonets.”364 Eventually the marshal somehow
devised a strategy to enter the house from the back door and
serve his writ,365 and held the women captive. After a habeas
corpus action to win the release of the women failed, the
Pennsylvania legislature backed down, calling for a
withdrawal of the militia, and the governor ultimately paid
out the money for the ransom of the women.366 An uprising
against federal authority was narrowly averted.
General Bright and his armed soldiers who had
threatened the marshal were put on trial for obstruction of
justice367 and found guilty, but President Madison—who had
been so closely involved with the Olmstead case thirty years
before—commuted their sentences because they were acting
under a “mistaken sense of duty.”368
Thus, the same kinds of disputes that arose between
Americans and foreigners also arose between citizens of
different states. The threat of Civil War in the early years of
the Republic was real. That the colonies would dissolve into
civil war, if independent, had been a favorite “Tory
argument.”369 This was in part because British creditors were
not the only ones to suffer in the courts; American debtors
did as well. Rhode Island was a particular villain, shutting
down its courts to creditors both foreign and out-of-state
alike, and in turn, its merchants were shut out of other
states’ courts.370 At the North Carolina ratifying convention,
364. Id.
365. JOHN F. WATSON, 3 ANNALS OF PHILADELPHIA, BEING A COLLECTION OF
MEMOIRS, ANECDOTES, AND INCIDENTS OF THE CITY AND ITS INHABITANTS 93 (Willis
P. Hazard ed., 1884), available at http://archive.org/stream/annalsofphiladel
03wats/annalsofphiladel03wats_djvu.txt.
366. Carson, supra note 224, at 396-97.
367. Id. at 397.
368. Douglas, supra note 225, at 11-12.
369. NEVINS, supra note 169, at 545.
370. See id. at 571 (“Rhode Island creditors were virtually outlawed in the
neighboring States, and could no more collect a note at face value than a Boston
creditor could collect a note in full in Providence.”).
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William Davie expressed the need for impartial courts so that
“a debt may be recovered from the citizen of one state as soon
as from the citizen of another.”371 A citizen of Massachusetts,
he argued, “might be ruined” before he could recover a debt
in Virginia.372
Even apart from the grievances between the states, the
United States lacked any role models for nations that
functioned smoothly with a federal court system. In arguing
for diversity jurisdiction, Hamilton had to reach back to
fifteenth-century Germany for an example of a successful
court system that functioned well in a federal nation.373
Conflicts in the Prize Cases between states, or between the
states and Congress, only reinforced this heavy feeling that
Americans were not yet a unified nation.
Given the threat of war from inside and out, it is not
surprising that the Framers themselves might have seen
diversity litigation as a way to maintain “national peace and
harmony.” Four out of the five plans for the Constitution
provided for alienage jurisdiction, but the Virginia
Resolution was the only one that also included jurisdiction
over disputes between “citizens of other states.”374 But when
the plan became the focus of discussion at the Convention,
the specific language was dropped, and replaced with a more
general provision that the federal courts’ jurisdiction should
extend to “‘all cases arising under the national laws and to
such other questions as may involve the national peace and
harmony.’”375 The Committee of Detail—made up of
371. 4 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 87, at 159.
372. Id.
373. Hamilton compared the situation the United States might face in the
absence of diversity jurisdiction to the “private wars which distracted and
desolated Germany prior to the institution of the Imperial Chamber by
Maximilian, towards the close of the fifteenth century; and informs us at the same
time of the vast influence of that institution in appeasing the disorders and
establishing the tranquility of the empire.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 536-37
(Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1889).
374. James William Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past,
Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1964).
375. Id. at 3 (quoting MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 119 (1913).
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Ellsworth and Wilson—again made the grant of jurisdiction
more specific, replacing jurisdiction over issues involving the
“national peace and harmony” with “controversies . . .
between Citizens of different States, and between a State or
the Citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or
subjects.”376 “Thus,” Moore and Weckstein conclude, “it seems
a fair inference that diversity as well as alienage jurisdiction
were thought to be included within the general phrase
‘questions as may involve the national peace and
harmony.’”377
This relationship between diversity jurisdiction and
“national peace and harmony” might also help resolve what
John Frank called a “mystery truly dark—why did the
Congress of 1789 provide that appellate jurisdiction should
be sufficient in federal question cases while there should be
trial court jurisdiction in diversity cases?”378 Scholars have
offered several theories. One theory is that diversity
litigation would be more likely to invoke issues of fact rather
than issues of law, and that factual issues would be more
difficult to review without the unpopular means of overruling
a jury decision.379 Others have compellingly argued that
withholding federal question jurisdiction might have been
part of a compromise between Federalists and AntiFederalists, who feared that the federal courts would absorb
the state courts’ jurisdiction.380
But the Framers’ desire to provide jurisdiction over cases
involving the “national peace and harmony,” inspired in part
by the Prize Case experience, might offer another clue as to
why diversity was initially included in the inferior courts’
jurisdiction, where federal questions were not. The Prize
376. 2 Farrand, Records, supra note 86, at 186; Moore & Weckstein, supra note
374, at 3.
377. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 374, at 3 (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. &
HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 19 (1953)).
378. Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 28.
379. James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal
Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 641 (1942) (noting that “[a] possible explanation
may well lie in the fact that the possibilities of discrimination in diversity cases
were most likely to be realized in the fact-finding aspects of the trial, beyond the
reach of review.”).
380. Holt, The Invention of Federal Courts, supra note 24, at 1484-89.
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Cases taught that diversity cases were functionally federal
question cases, and at the time, their placement in federal
courts were deemed even more essential to the survival of the
new country. Preserving the national peace and harmony—
whether threatened by disputes with foreign citizens, or
citizens of other states—was an essential part of preserving
the Nation itself. The Framers may have been just as
concerned with these “federal questions” as they were with
the ones we generally include within federal question
jurisdiction today.
CONCLUSION
The Framers’ judicial experience in the Prize Cases is
noticeably absent from the civil procedure or federal courts
literature, and is rarely invoked when discussing the origins
of the national judiciary. This Article has sought to correct
this oversight, re-acquainting scholars with the influence of
the Prize Cases, and focusing more specifically on the Cases’
influence on diversity jurisdiction. Viewing diversity
litigation through the actual litigation experience of the
Framers reveals why the need for a neutral forum for
diversity disputes seemed so obvious at the time of the
Convention, and might explain the lack of any debate on
what were otherwise controversial propositions. The Prize
Case experience also exemplified how a real threat of foreign
and domestic war could arise from clumsily handled state
court litigation. Above all else, the Prize Case experience
rehabilitates the view that geographic bias was a driving
force behind the grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal
courts.
Thayer asked the question that sparked this Article,
Friendly’s,381 and many others: why diversity litigation?
Thayer’s article ultimately answered his own question. “It
was because,” he wrote, “in controversies between its own
citizens and those of other States or countries, it might be
expected that the courts of any given State would not be free
from bias.”382 Here, as so often, the simplest answer is also
the most accurate.
381. Friendly, supra note 3.
382. Thayer, supra note 2, at 316.

